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ABSTRACT 
To deter terrorism, U.S. deterrence strategy must threaten retaliatory responses 
that are appropriate to the actions by non-state actors the United States wishes to prevent.  
The effectiveness of those threats depends on the perceived credibility that America 
possesses the capability and willingness to execute them.  Although U.S. policy focuses 
on preventive and preemptive counterterrorism strategies, this thesis argues that it 
contains relevant targets for retaliation but lacks credibility because its threats do not 
distinguish between types of attack.  Instead of correlating threats to undesirable actions, 
it declares the same punishment for all terrorism, which is unrealistic ex post.  On the 
contrary, the level of response should be proportionally related to the type and destructive 
effects of an attack and in tune with the level of public outrage the attack would generate. 
This thesis first provides theoretical support for the claim that recent U.S. policy 
documents contain valid threats for influencing non-state actors.  Then, credibility is 
evaluated by comparing those threats to the expected U.S. response for two dissimilar 
scenarios: cyber and nuclear terrorism.  The analysis suggests that policy threats lack 
credibility because the signaled response for terrorism holds constant across varying 
degrees of attack severity.  Because the likely responses to these attacks differ in practice, 
the undifferentiated signals sent by recent policy weaken deterrence.  As a result, the 
thesis recommends establishing a retaliation framework based on type of attack. 
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While many actions have been taken to better secure the U.S. homeland from 
catastrophic terrorist attacks, one strategy potentially underutilized is deterrence.  In 
recent years, Homeland Security doctrine has relied heavily on two defensive strategies: 
disrupting operations and protecting critical targets.  Although both remain relevant and 
necessary to counter terrorism, they have inherent limitations that make it advisable to 
consider supplementing these strategies with a more robust deterrence policy.  Lewis 
Dunn describes the recent policy like this: 
For the most part, however, recent attention has focused on consequence 
management, and to a lesser extent prevention of incidents involving 
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.  Deterring terrorist or sub-
national use has been essentially dismissed out of hand.  This may be 
faulty logic.1 
First, prevention is extremely difficult and unlikely to be foolproof. To discern 
actual plans in the malevolent rhetoric of elusive organizations, and then manage to 
disrupt, capture, and punish offenders before they actually commit the act, is an 
enormous undertaking.  This arduous task not only puts a tremendous burden on agencies 
tasked with uncovering the covert plans of veiled organizations, but forces them to 
perform a balancing act between maintaining security and upholding civil liberties. 
Second, as difficult as it is to prevent an attack, the goal of making the citizens and 
infrastructure of the United States impenetrable is practically impossible.  Elbridge Colby 
claims that “in between these two extremes, deterrence is a security policy that offers a 
way forward for the United States that is not only more effective because more tailored, 
but is also more moral.”2  Therefore, an effective deterrence by punishment policy 
should play a critical role in a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.   
                                                 
1 Lewis A. Dunn, "Rethinking Deterrence:  A New Logic to Meet Twenty First Century Challenges" 
In Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala, (Westport, 
Conn.: Praeger, 2001), 23–38, 24. 
2 Elbridge Colby, "Restoring Deterrence," Orbis 51, no. 3 (Summer, 2007), 413–428, 424. 
2 
 
This thesis explores the characteristics of a retribution policy that would support a 
Homeland Security strategy aimed at deterring non-state actors from attacking the United 
States.  It claims that, to improve the deterrent effect of counterterrorism strategies, the 
United States should tailor threats of punishment to match the crime (the latter based 
roughly on the magnitude of harm) because this approach will increase the credibility of 
its deterrent message.  To support this claim, the study examines the declared threats of 
punishment for terrorist attacks that are found in recent policy, and evaluates whether 
those responses would be politically acceptable whilst having the desired effect.  It is 
important to note that for the purpose of this study the objective is to deter terrorist 
attacks on the United States, not to deter the existence of terrorism itself.   
B. PURPOSE 
One way that the United States signals deterrence is through its national strategy 
documents and, more specifically, the threats of punishment contained therein.  The 
effectiveness of these threats depends on the perceived credibility that the United States 
possesses the capability and willingness to execute them.  Assuming the United States 
has the capability, the effectiveness of deterrence is dependent upon the credibility of the 
retaliatory threat.  Although U.S. policy shifted after September 11, 2001 (9/11) towards 
preemptive and preventive methods to strike targets of terrorism, I argue that: 1) it also 
contains relevant deterrent threats that 2) lack credibility because there is no distinction 
between types of attack and threatened response.  To clarify the second point, it is the 
public declaration of current policy that I scrutinize, not whether policy makers 
understand how to prescribe realistic responses for different attacks. The reason for this 
focus is that public declaratory policy is one of the most visible ways in which the United 
States communicates deterrent threats to non-state actors. 
With this in mind, I intend to qualitatively analyze the various threats of 
retaliation through a scenario-based evaluation to show that U.S. policy lacks deterrence 
credibility, and suggest that a deterrence framework that links retaliatory threats to the 
type of terrorist attack would solve this problem.  The objective of this thesis is first to 
validate that counterterrorism policies of the United States contain relevant threats of 
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punishment for effective deterrence, and then analyze these threats as potential forms of 
punishment in response to different attack scenarios, thereby showing that credibility of 
those threats is degraded when they are not correlated to the type of attack. 
The thesis closes by suggesting that U.S. deterrence strategy should contain an 
attack-based framework for retaliation in order to credibly threaten violent non-state 
actors and advocating continued development of punitive deterrence methods for 
Homeland Security.  If credible threats were identified for each type of terrorist attack, 
then the United States could institutionalize the appropriate responses into a clearly 
articulated deterrence policy.  Developing a retaliation framework, based on type of 
attack, provides a critical step in bridging the gap between theories on deterring terrorism 
and current counterterrorism strategies, to form a more relevant and effective policy for 
deterring terrorism.   
C. REQUIREMENTS OF EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE 
Deterrence, as it relates to national security strategy, can be divided into two 
categories.  First, state deterrence addresses threats to national security from both nuclear 
and conventional acts of war committed by other nations.  Strategies for implementing 
this type of deterrence are relatively straightforward in policy and widely accepted due to 
the tangibility of punishing states.  The second category, however, strives to deter 
domestic and transnational actors from attempting random acts of violence that inflict 
property damage and injury to citizens.  Punishment threats for this type of deterrence are 
found in the U.S. penal codes for prosecuting domestic terrorists and U.S. national 
strategy documents for non-state actors.   
Setting aside domestic criminology, the debate on whether punitive deterrence is 
an effective strategy to deter non-state actors mainly concentrates on the question of 
credible retaliation.  To be more concise, what practical form of retaliation would deter 
terrorists from committing attacks?  In contemplating this question, it is apparent that 
terrorist organizations do not fit into the traditional framework for deterring states.  
Although some of the established standards for state deterrence are applicable to non-
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state actors, those of retribution are mostly inapplicable.  And while retribution remains a 
critical component of deterrence, defining a retaliation policy for counterterrorism 
presents unique challenges.  Therefore, several approaches to deterring non-state actors 
are rooted in traditional theories of criminology, because terrorists’ behavioral patterns 
emulate those of criminal organizations that operate either within or outside the national 
boundaries.3   Nevertheless, an effective deterrence strategy should incorporate a policy 
that describes the behavior to be deterred, and the retaliation it will invoke, if committed. 
In order to effectively deter a violent non-state actor, there must be a potential to 
influence its decision cycle.  This would presume that non-state actors follow some 
process to evaluate options and predict outcomes when making decisions.  The ability to 
influence these decisions is important because deterrence by punishment necessitates that 
something of value can be held at risk, which would only hold true if non-state actors 
calculate expected utility.  The difficulty rests in identifying, and then plausibly 
threatening, targets of significance to the terrorists.  While a state fears loss of material 
power, public support and sovereignty, terrorists are non-state actors that may be able to 
operate without geographical or demographical constraints.  Therefore, deterring terrorist 
attacks comes down to identifying what terrorists covet and fear, then transforming that 
into a credible threat message.  However, any threat that trespasses the boundaries of 
American sense of justice or breaks international norms would not be credible forms of 
retaliation.  Consequently, identifying significant targets to threaten with credible means 
and intent is a complicated, although necessary, task. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The origins of deterrence theory are traced to studies of crime and punishment by 
Jeremy Bentham, who postulated that criminals rationally consider punishment costs 
when deciding whether to commit a crime.  He further stated that having clear, 
consistent, and proportional punishment provides a certain level of predictability that 
                                                 
3 Ariel Merari, "Deterring Fear: Government Responses to Terrorist Attacks," Harvard International 
Review 23, no. 4 (Winter, 2002), 26–31, 26. 
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enhances deterrence effects.4  During the Cold War, scholarly research went through 
phases that were creatively described by Jervis as the “three waves” of deterrence 
theory.5  However, the bipolar system that was so central in these strategies dissolved 
with the end of the Cold War, ushering in a new era of asymmetric threats.  Jeffrey Knopf 
describes this new phase as the “fourth wave” of deterrence research, which focuses on 
deterring non-state actors and rogue regimes through both denial and punishment 
methods.6  A significant amount of the current literature debates the usefulness and 
practicality of deterrence as an effective strategy for U.S. policy in a unipolar system 
faced with asymmetric threats.   
Although some negate its efficacy, most experts agree that deterrence remains a 
viable strategy against asymmetric threats.  The literature can be subdivided into two 
general categories based on the underlying assumption of whether a state can possibly 
deter non-state actors (terrorist organizations).  On one side of the argument, researchers 
presume terrorists are irrational fanatics that cannot be deterred and, therefore, suggest 
indirect deterrence strategies aimed at rogue states and those providing support that 
enables terrorist attacks.  Paul Kapur proposes a “third-party” punishment strategy to 
deter entities that provide finances, weapons, asylum, and other support to terrorists, 
instead of attempting to target irrational, elusive terrorists themselves.7  A significant 
amount of literature in this category runs parallel to counter-proliferation objectives, in 
the sense that it seeks to influence the supply-side of WMD transfer.  David Auerswald 
suggests that preventing WMD transfer remains the most important goal, and posits a 
denial and punishment strategy aimed at transnational criminal organizations that might 
engage in trafficking WMD materials.8  On the contrary, Elbridge Colby argues that 
                                                 
4 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge, UK : Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004), 145, 8. 
5 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge, UK : Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004), 145, 21. 
6 Jeffrey W. Knopf, "The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research" (forthcoming in Contemporary 
Security Policy). 
7 S. Paul Kapur, "Deterring Nuclear Terrorists" In Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, 
eds. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2009), 117. 
8 David P. Auerswald, "Deterring Nonstate WMD Attacks," Political Science Quarterly 121, no. 4 
(Winter, 2006), 543–568, 567. 
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WMD proliferation is inevitable and trying to prevent it is a waste of resources; therefore, 
deterring attacks by threatening those who enable terrorism remains the preeminent 
strategy that, if effective, would reduce the incentive for acquiring WMD.9  Alexander 
George provides three forms of indirect deterrence that seek to influence state 
sponsorship by enlisting third-party influence, bolstering one side of a divided leadership, 
or applying pressure from an opposing regime.10  Melese and Angelis move beyond state-
based deterrence to suggest a United Nations deterrence strategy to discourage terrorists 
from acquiring and using WMD under the threat that the Secretary General would react 
to WMD activities by ceasing efforts to restrain Security Council members from 
preemptive or retaliatory strikes.11  In summary, these studies explore the employment of 
denial and punishment strategies to prevent non-state actors and rogue states from 
providing terrorists with safe-havens, weapons, materials, or technology.12   
The second category of literature suggests that although a few committed martyrs 
behave irrationally, other members of the organization logically calculate the cost-to-
benefit ratio of their decisions.13  Although there remains some skepticism as to what 
degree, this literature supports direct deterrence approaches that also suggest both denial 
and punishment strategies.  For example, Trager and Zagorcheva suggest using 
deterrence by denial and punishment against all components of the terrorist system, 
focusing on their political aims especially when dealing with local issues.14  Nonetheless, 
the majority of work here focuses on denial methods, mainly due to the difficulty 
                                                 
9 Colby, "Restoring Deterrence," 413–428, 427. 
10 Alexander L. George, "The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of 
Adversaries" In Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and their Strategic Cultures, eds. Barry 
R. Schneider and Jerrold M. Post, 2nd ed. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Wash. D.C.: USAF 
Counterproliferation Center, 2003), 325, 275. 
11 Francois Melese and Diana Angelis, "Deterring Terrorists from using WMD: A Brinkmanship 
Strategy for the United Nations," Defense & Security Analysis 20, no. 4 (Dec, 2004), 337–341, 339. 
12 Wyn Bowen, "Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-State Actors and Mass Casualty Terrorism," 
Contemporary Security Policy 25, no. 1 (2004), 54–70., 67; Kapur, Deterring Nuclear Terrorists, 122. 
13 Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It can be done," 
International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter, 2005), 87–123, 88; Bowen, Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-State 
Actors and Mass Casualty Terrorism, 54–70, 62. 
14Trager and Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It can be done," 87–123, 99. 
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associated with applying punishment strategies to non-state actors.  These studies propose 
a defensive strategy, in which deterrence by denial is achieved by protecting targets to 
increase the relative cost of perpetrating attacks while marginalizing their potential 
effects in an effort to dissuade terrorists.15  Amid this debate, few discard a punishment 
strategy but suggest rather a policy that utilizes both while describing the potential of 
denial methods with greater emphasis.16   
The main argument against this defensive approach points out that it is impossible 
to protect everything and while terrorists may be deterred from attacking a hardened 
target, this deterrence effect does not preclude them from exploiting a soft target 
instead.17  Furthermore, a nation has infinite vulnerabilities, so attempting to secure all of 
them would be an ineffective use of resources that, in the end, could prove economically 
disastrous.18  When considering these limitations, evidence suggests that deterring 
terrorist attacks by threat of punishment provides a logical supplement to the 
aforementioned strategies, not only because it helps fill the gaps left by the impractical 
task of securing a limitless number of targets or disrupting covert operations, but also 
because it deals with the inevitability of proliferation.  For example, deterring rogue 
states from supporting terrorism seems realistic when the U.S. possesses ultimate military 
superiority, but what credible threat could it impose on Russia for nuclear proliferation 
violations (intentional or inadvertent)—certainly not nuclear retaliation.  On the other 
hand, effectively deterring terrorists from committing catastrophic attacks eliminates the 
demand for WMD and, therefore, removes the predicament of punishing Russia or any 
other world power for allowing WMD to leak to non-state actors. 
                                                 
15Trager and Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It can be done," 87–123, 91. 
16Bowen, "Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-State Actors and Mass Casualty Terrorism," 54–70, 67; 
Cimbala, Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation in the Twenty-First Century, 185, 170. 
17Bowen, “Deterrence and Asymmetry,” 62. 
18 Elbridge A. Colby, "Expanded Deterrence: Broadening the Threat of Retaliation," Policy Review, 
no. 149 (Jun/Jul, 2008), 43–59, 44; Paul K. Davis and Brian M. Jenkins, Deterrence & Influence in 
Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on Al Qaeda (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002), 86, 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1619/ (accessed 4/15/2009), xiv. 
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However, in assuming that a more holistic policy should include strategies for 
deterring terrorist organizations by threat of punishment, the practicality of a plausible 
retaliation remains.  Successful deterrence by punishment hinges on the premise that the 
deterrer can clearly communicate a credible threat of severe retaliation against a terrorist 
group’s center of gravity if they attack.  Literature on this topic discusses methods to 
overcome the complications associated with first identifying terrorist vulnerabilities, next 
determining how to legitimately retaliate, and then effectively communicating a deterrent 
message.  The major research dealing with directly influencing terrorist organizations 
comes from Davis and Jenkins.  They hypothesize that, while a few fanatics may be 
irrational, a large number of members in a terrorist system—leaders, lieutenants, religious 
figures, logistical elements and recruiters—can be influenced.19  Arguments claiming that 
terrorists cannot be deterred seem to focus on the suicidal foot soldiers and overlook 
other important members of the organization.20  For example, during the Cold War, the 
objective of deterrence was not to deter individual soldiers of the Soviet military, but to 
convince leaders and key elements that launching an attack would prove detrimental to 
their goals and livelihood.  Therefore, identifying the vulnerabilities or desires of other 
amenable members of the group would provide objectives for credible retaliation that 
when explicitly communicated, or executed after an attack, would conceivably lead to an 
effective deterrent.  Many proponents suggest that the U.S. response to the attacks by al 
Qaeda on September 11, 2001 has provided a foundation for deterrence by punishment 
from which to build a solid policy.21  Lawrence Freedman hence concludes that “the 
claim that deterrence does not work with terrorism can be challenged … [because] even if 
some attacks succeed, little political consequence will follow and those responsible can 
expect that they will be hounded down and punished.”22 
Again, a fundamental component of building a credible retribution is that the 
punisher can target something of value to the deterree.  Trager and Zagorcheva, for 
                                                 
19Colby, "Expanded Deterrence: Broadening the Threat of Retaliation," 43–59, xi. 
20Ibid., xii. 
21Ibid., 47. 
22Freedman, Deterrence, 145, 124. 
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example, recommend targeting the entire terrorist system and groups’ political goals with 
retaliatory threats.23  Additionally, Gerald Steinberg and others suggest that retribution 
should incorporate massive retaliation, even excessive in proportion, to increase the 
terrorists’ realized costs beyond acceptable levels.24  Colby calls for an expanded 
deterrence strategy that would not only threaten retaliation against those operationally 
involved, but to everyone involved including governments and entities that cooperate or 
are complicit with an attack.25  Daniel Whiteneck discusses threatening “interests of 
society,” such as striking public infrastructure, but warns that attacks on other supporting 
infrastructure like schools, religious centers, or civilians would do more harm than 
good.26  He states, the “key is to extend deterrence using conventional and nuclear forces 
to the societal elements that support terrorism.”27  Although these target-restriction 
arguments remain valid, they are based on the assumption that retaliation means military 
strikes; but, as Knopf points out, broader “fourth wave” research increasingly explores 
non-military options when proposing acceptable forms of retribution.28  Threatening 
these targets would not necessarily invoke military retaliation, but would utilize other 
elements of national power to produce the desired influence.29 
Finally, an effective deterrence policy must include a deterrent message so the 
deterree undoubtedly comprehends the consequences of specific actions.  As Whiteneck 
puts it, “to make the deterrent threat clearer and to maximize its credibility, an adversary 
must be able to predict soundly what the scope of a state’s response to an attack could be, 
not just what it would be.”30  The message must convey the relationship between the 
                                                 
23Trager and Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It can be done," 87–123, 88. 
24Gerald M. Steinberg, "Rediscovering Deterrence After September 11, 2001," Jerusalem 
Letter/Viewpoints No. 467 (2001), http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp467.htm (accessed 4/10/2008). 
25Colby, "Expanded Deterrence: Broadening the Threat of Retaliation," 43–59, 46. 
26Daniel Whiteneck, "Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on a Framework," The Washington Quarterly 28, 
no. 3 (Summer, 2005), 187–199, 194–195. 
27Ibid., 198. 
28Knopf, "The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,” 18. 
29Davis and Jenkins, "Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on Al 
Qaeda," 86, xiii. 
30Whiteneck, "Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on a Framework," 187–199, 189. 
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important elements of action and reaction, and will be even more effective if the reaction 
has some level of automaticity.  Several authors describe a strategy that would punish 
those who cross clearly-articulated red lines like attacks using nuclear, biological or 
chemical weapons (NBC).31  However, as Knopf accurately points out, the use of 
chemical or biological agents does not always equate to a weapon of mass destruction.32  
Therefore, it is important to define specifically the retaliatory response based on the level 
of damage, not just the type of weapon employed in an attack.  Hence, accurately 
defining the type of attack that constitutes a violation (red line crossed) and its correlated 
retaliation could provide the basis for an effective deterrent strategy.  Lastly, it is 
important to institutionalize the retaliatory response to make it nearly automatic, thereby 
removing any doubt on the part of terrorists that “bureaucratic deliberation” would 
interfere.33  Auerswald emphatically states that, “Most importantly, our deterrence threats 
stand a better chance of appearing credible if we demonstrate that we have no choice but 
to implement our threats should that be necessary.”34 
In closing, regardless of what methodology the literature employed, the majority 
of reviewed research positively advocated the value of deterrence strategy in preventing 
terrorism.  Also common throughout this research, experts acknowledged the limitation 
of deterrence and suggested it be part of a comprehensive grand strategy that incorporates 
various methods to address both the terrorist networks and potential supporters through 
all elements of national power.35  Both direct and indirect deterrent efforts aimed at non-
state actors provide legitimate methods to prevent terrorist attacks.  However, those 
efforts that focus on the supply side fail to address the situation once proliferation has 
occurred.  And, deterrence by denial strategies that hinge on defensive measures do not 
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account for limited resources or the natural reactions of populations after an attempted 
attack.  An effective deterrence by punishment strategy would fill these gaps; and, while 
the literature provides support for this method, it does not provide a framework for 
determining the appropriate punishment.  The literature confirms that deterrence by 
punishment can play an important role in preventing attacks, if the policy clearly 
articulates a defined retaliation that threatens terrorists’ centers of gravity in response for 
a specific type of attack.  A valuable framework would address the difficult facet of 
proposing a comprehensible retaliation policy that incorporates all elements of national 
power.  It would develop an attack reprisal doctrine that would effectively deter terrorists, 
yet be publically acceptable, while possessing some level of automaticity. 
E. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
As the literature suggests, punitive deterrence is based on fear of retaliation, and 
that fear is generated by the risk of real loss.  The key to deterring violent non-state actors 
is first to identify those elements the terrorist system can ill afford to lose then credibly 
signal the intent to retaliate against those elements should a terrorist group attack 
America.  As a result, terrorists will weigh the benefits of attacking the United States 
against the losses they will sustain from that response.  Consequently, U.S. deterrence 
strategy must send a message that clearly states the punishment that is directly associated 
with the undesired actions of non-state actors. 
However, the level of response should be proportionally related to the type and 
destructive effects of an attack to be in tune with the level of public outrage the attack 
generates.  Would the United States really impose the same punishment on a non-state 
actor committing cyber terrorism as it would for nuclear terrorism?  A uniform policy 
towards all terrorism may signal the intent, but lack credibility.  Jeffrey Knopf touched on 
this dilemma in his article “Wrestling with Deterrence” and suggested developing a 
“situation-specific” deterrence policy that would clearly articulate consequences for 
crossing specified red lines.36  Furthermore, if current policy makes costs uniformly high, 
                                                 
36Knopf, "Wrestling with Deterrence: Bush Administration Strategy After 9/11," 229–265, 255. 
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it could unintentionally drive the terrorists toward larger more destructive attacks.  In 
other words, since the intended response to terrorism does not vary by the type or 
magnitude of terrorist attack, terrorists’ expected utility is directly proportional to the 
level of attack. 
On the contrary, instead of correlating threats to undesirable actions, U.S. policy 
threatens all terrorism behavior with the same degree of punishment, which is unrealistic 
ex post.  As David Auerswald notes, it is not clear that the current policy broadcasts a 
deterrent threat because it “vows to kill or capture terrorists regardless of whether they 
have attacked the U.S.”37  This methodology also runs contrary to standards of crime and 
punishment, where the level of punishment correlates to the degree of crime.  Assuming 
the level of retaliation is proportionally constrained by the magnitude of attack and size 
of the terrorist organization, a limited terrorist attack orchestrated by a small and isolated 
group might require little to no military reprisal.  In contrast, a nuclear detonation in 
Chicago by a large, complex network with state sponsorship more likely warrants a full 
military campaign.  Nonetheless, U.S. policy signals the same punishment for terrorism 
that involves a car bomb attack in a foreign country as one that kills thousands in a U.S 
city. 
F. METHODOLGY 
U.S. policy documents provide information about the most current 
counterterrorism strategies that serve as potential threats of deterrence.  These strategies 
would need to meet two criteria for them to signal credible deterrent threats.  First, the 
methods must be relevant in the sense that they threaten effective targets for retribution—
they must hold something the non-state actor covets at risk.  Second, the threats must be 
credible in that the method of retaliation would be supported as a reasonable response to 
the undesired action.  For the purpose of this study, U.S. policies reviewed were the most 
current at the time of writing.  While they are subject to change with the new Obama  
 
                                                 
37Auerswald, "Deterring Nonstate WMD Attacks," 543–568, 546. 
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administration, it is anticipated that some elements of strategy will remain the same.  In 
addition, the lessons learned from an analysis of Bush-era strategy can help inform future 
strategy.   
To evaluate U.S. strategy under the first criterion, each of the counterterrorism 
methods is compared to a theoretical model of critical vulnerabilities of non-state actors.  
If these methods prove relevant to the identified vulnerabilities under this analysis, then 
current strategy contains effective punishment threats that can be examined under 
different attack scenarios to evaluate the second criterion—credibility.  To evaluate the 
second criterion, the expected U.S. response is evaluated for dissimilar attack scenarios to 
demonstrate the lack of credibility.  Specifically, the thesis compares retaliatory threats 
for cyber-terrorism and a nuclear attack.  Showing that the signaled response holds 
constant for varying degrees of terrorism will highlight the potential un-believability of 
deterrent signals in current policy.  This evidence in turn supports an argument for 
establishing a retaliation framework based on type of attack, as opposed to the simple fact 
of terrorist activity.  In conclusion, the evaluated responses to both types of attack—cyber 
and nuclear—are used to demonstrate how a theoretical retaliation framework for 
deterring non-state actors would look.   
G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Already covered in this introductory chapter is the background and purpose of the 
research, discussion and literature review on the topic of deterrence, and the theoretical 
framework and methodology of the analysis.  Chapter II begins with analysis on the 
question of whether a state can deter non-state actors from committing undesirable actions.   
The ability to deter terrorists is a fundamental component of this thesis and vital to defining 
the “nodes-of-influence” that a deterrence strategy must threaten in order to manipulate 
decisions.  From this discussion on influencing terrorists, critical components of retribution 
are identified in order to develop a set of terrorist vulnerabilities that align with their nodes-
of-influence.   Moreover, these nodes-of-influence comprise the Centers of Gravity (COGs) 




retaliation.  By evaluating the targets of recent policy on counterterrorism, this approach 
makes it possible to assess the relevance of current policy threats as possible responses to 
terrorist attacks in the following chapters. 
Chapter III analyzes the potential targets and credible responses to a hypothetical 
terrorist attack on U.S. critical infrastructure.  It begins with a review of relevant policy to 
establish a common frame of reference.  The next section provides a narrative overview 
of the scenario to include general details of the event, participants, and consequences of 
the attack.  Next, the scenario is analyzed to determine a list of potential targets to punish 
in retaliation for the attack.  These targets are then compared to the objectives of U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy identified in Chapter II to determine if it effectively targets a 
node-of-influence.  Finally, those policy threats corresponding to relevant targets are 
individually evaluated to determine their credibility as a method of retaliation for this 
scenario.  The results are tabulated for comparison to those of the next chapter. 
Chapter IV mirrors the previous chapter in format and intent, but is written in the 
context of a nuclear terrorist attack scenario.  This chapter also consists of: a brief review 
of relevant policy, scenario overview, analysis of potential targets of retaliation, 
comparison of policy threats to scenario targets, and summary of results.  The results are 
again tabulated for comparison to the results of the previous chapter. 
The final chapter contains a compilation of the results and a comparative review 
of the credible retaliation options for each scenario.  The comparison illustrates the 
differences in the expected response to differing types of terrorist attack, in order to 
support the argument that current policy does not signal credible threats of retaliation.  
This is an issue that must be resolved before the Unites States can put forth an effective 
deterrence strategy.  This chapter closes with a policy recommendation to fill this gap by 
proposing a retaliation framework that signals credible deterrence threats by tailoring the 
response to the type of attack. 
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II. VALIDATION OF CURRENT POLICY THREATS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter assesses whether current counterterrorism strategies of the United 
States hold at risk the most relevant targets for retribution—whether credibly signaled or 
not.  For this to hold true, its strategy must target those centers of gravity that will most 
influence a non-state actor’s decisions.  To carry out this assessment, this chapter begins 
with discussion of whether a threat of punishment has any impact on the decisions of 
violent non-state actors.  If the potential to influence non-state actors’ decisions does 
exist, then the next step is determining which factors hold the most weight in those 
decisions.  Identifying what those actors hold dear produces a list of vulnerabilities that 
when credibly threatened will influence outcomes.  Finally, if current counterterrorism 
strategies correlate with the vulnerabilities identified through this theoretical approach, 
then its methods constitute relevant threats.  
The first part of this chapter explores the question of whether violent non-state 
actors react to influence exerted in the form of a deterrent threat.  It discusses various 
theories on decision making to analyze how well they reflect the behavior of terrorist 
organizations.  Determining which of the various behavior theories most accurately 
describes a non-state actor will help make clear whether or not such actors might be 
affected by deterrent threats.  The next section identifies terrorists’ “nodes-of-influence.”  
Nodes-of-influence represent those components of the terrorist system that contribute to 
its decisions and affect its operations.  In turn, these nodes represent these centers of 
gravity that need to be targeted in an effective retaliation framework.  Therefore, 
potential vulnerabilities of the centers of gravity are derived from literature on 
counterterrorism strategy and deterring non-state actors.  For the purpose of this study, 
current policy strategies will be deemed to contain relevant threats of retaliation if their 
targets align with these vulnerabilities.   
To identify current deterrent threats, primary counterterrorism strategies are 
extracted from U.S. policy documents and followed with discussion on how well they 
16 
 
correlate to vulnerabilities of the nodes-of-influence.  The last step compares these 
counterterrorism methods against the theoretical model developed later in this chapter—
results tabulated in Table 1.  In summary, this chapter intends to support claims that 
violent non-state actors have coveted desires and assets that when appropriately 
threatened cause them to make responsive decisions to avoid loss and, more importantly, 
to show that the current policies of the U.S. contain the relevant methods to target those 
vulnerabilities.  To the extent these options are validated, their credibility can then be 
evaluated under hypothetical attack scenarios in subsequent chapters.   
B. DETERRING VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS 
As discussed earlier, to influence a non-state actor there must be a credible threat 
that holds something it values at risk.  This risk emerges as a result of directing a threat 
towards a specific vulnerability (Threat + Vulnerability = Risk).  Since threat is generated 
through the deterrent message, the undetermined variable is vulnerability.  Theory on 
organizational behavior provides the most fruitful approach to identify non-state actors’ 
nodes-of-influence which in turn yield vulnerabilities to threaten with retaliation. 
To ensure clarity of the relationships and lexicon within this thesis, a diagram of 
the concept and related terms is shown in Figure 1.  Boxes in dark grey represent how the 
vulnerabilities associated with components of an organization have a potential to 
influence non-state actors’ decisions.  The other boxes illustrate the steps involved in 
establishing a relevant threat—i.e., threatening targets associated with centers of gravity 




Figure 1.   Threat transmission diagram 
This concept must now be translated into an operational approach in order to 
identify actual components and vulnerabilities for non-state actors.  Working this process 
in reverse, the first step requires analysis on influencing non-state actors’ decisions.  
Based on that analysis, a representative model can be selected to provide “nodes-of-
influence” for a non-state actor system from which to identify the associated 
vulnerabilities. 
C. ANALYSIS OF NON-STATE ACTOR BEHAVIOR 
This section discusses the rationality of terrorists, their group dynamics, and their 
organizational structure.  The literature debates whether a violent non-state actor’s 
behavior can be characterized as rational, thus raising questions concerning the 
possibility of deterring terrorists through threat of punishment.  Rational, in this context, 
would describe a subject that operates with stable and transitive preferences, and that 
makes decisions based on expected utility.  Opponents of this argument view terrorists as 
irrational, unpredictable actors that make decisions without regard to outcomes, and 
therefore impervious to deterrent threats.  However, to assume that terrorists are irrational 
because they chose to attack powerful nation states or commit suicide attacks contradicts 
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evidence concerning terrorist organizations presented below.  This presumption seems to 
focus more on fanatical terrorist operatives who execute the decisions and less on those 
involved in making them. 
Regardless, a significant weakness of the classic rational actor approach, as 
Fearon points out, is that it does not consider the decision-makers’ point of view when 
attempting to predict actions.38  This might explain the tendency to discount terrorists as 
irrational objects because their actions do not fit neatly into a particular perception of 
rational choice.  Similarly, Lebow is critical of rational choice deterrence theory because 
it fails to take into account how the initiator perceives and deals with risk.  He claims that 
rational choice outcomes vary between actors who prefer to maximize gains and those 
that maximize loss, thereby changing how each calculates expected utility.39  He goes on 
to state that, “whether or not an actor is rational is beside the point.  Deterrence theory 
does not predict that initiators will be rational.  It specifies the conditions under which 
rational initiators will choose not to attack.”40   
Putting this into the context of non-state actors, Alexander George points out that 
assumptions of rationality have historically proved limited in dealing with state leaders 
during previous conflicts and the Cold War—and there are additional limitations when 
dealing with non-state actors.41  He presents seven specific characteristics (paraphrased 
below) evident in analysis of non-state actors that provide useful insight into this 
challenge of identifying adequate vulnerabilities to exploit.42 
1. Unlike state leaders, non-state actors are not protecting geographical 
bound areas and infrastructure. 
2. Behavioral patterns of non-state actors increase the difficulty in 
influencing their cost-benefit analysis. 
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3. Non-state actors lack organizational structure and clear lines of authority. 
4. It is difficult to influence a group with coercive efforts because sub-actors 
may have opposing viewpoints. 
5. Non-state actors have higher levels of motivation than the more dominant 
state. 
6. Attempting to pressure other states to take action against the non-state 
actors is difficult. 
7. Non-state actors exploit the coercing state’s political and societal 
constraints. 
Consequently, George posits that an actor-specific behavioral model provides a better 
approach for analysis of non-state actors. 
From this perspective, the unitary-rational actor theory fails to universally define 
the decision making process of non-state actors.  However, it may prove useful in 
predicting outcomes if the analysis takes the subject’s prejudices into consideration rather 
than those of the analyst.  The claim that non-state actors behave irrationally only 
addresses the non-traditional value its leader assigns to costs and benefits.  None of the 
counterarguments refute that, through some process, they weigh options to determine 
relative advantage.  Rationality is relative to one’s point of view in that actions of a 
terrorist may appear irrational to the observer yet quite logical to the subject.  Evidence 
that terrorists consider expected utility is found in a statement by Hamas leader M. Al 
Sahar: “We must examine the costs and benefits of continued armed operations.”43  
Therefore, applying theory of rational choice to non-state actors could prove beneficial in 
predicting behavior of specific individuals of an organization, but used alone would limit 
the target opportunities to those efforts aimed at goals of individuals and not the 
collective. 
Janis provides another possible model for non-state actors that describes how 
“groupthink” characteristics of a decision making body affect outcomes.  Hart explains 
three characteristics associated with groupthink as “those producing an overestimation of 
the group (illusion of invulnerability; belief in inherent morality), those producing closed-
mindedness (collective rationalizations; stereotyped images of out-groups), and those 
                                                 
43E. Berman, "Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An Economist's View of Radical 
Religious Militias," SSRN Working Paper Series (Oct, 2003), 1. 
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producing pressures toward uniformity (self-censorship; illusion of unanimity; direct 
pressures on dissenters; self-appointed mindguards).”44  This work could provide 
valuable insight into the dynamics of terrorist groups with respect to interactions between 
a radical leader and close advisors or the camaraderie of a terrorist cell.  However, it 
fails to represent other important components of the decision process, especially those 
entities enabling a non-state actor to operate. If terrorism is the product of a network or a 
system, parts of the network that are not part of the inner circle will be less susceptible to 
groupthink and therefore more likely to be influenced by costs and benefits. 
Lastly, Allison’s bureaucratic politics model describes a process wherein the 
decision of an organization comes not from a single rational actor, but more as a result of 
bargaining among its members.  Important to note, he states that its members 
(bureaucrats) are rational actors motivated by what is best for themselves and their 
organization.45  These “bureaucrats” use their specialized knowledge and asymmetrical 
information to manipulate decisions.  Allison posits that an organization’s decisions are 
influenced on the front-end, then manipulated during execution as a result of members’ 
ability to assert influence on the outcomes.  This would suggest that applying deterrent 
measures to control or alter this information-flow and influence would affect the 
organization’s decision process.  Consequently, Allison claims that it is important to 
identify “action channels” when attempting to predict decisions.46  Such channels would 
constitute those common players and established procedures involved in the decision 
process. 
Applying this concept to non-state actors would imply that, within a terrorist 
organization, multiple players at various layers influence the group’s decisions based on 
their perceptions and desired outcomes.  Analyzing some of the statements and policies 
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of Al Qaeda provides evidence that non-state actors behave in similar fashion.  As 
described by a Congressional Research Service Report, within Al Qaeda there are 
elements that have taken on the form of an organization with internal bureaucracy: 
Following the death of Abu Musab al Zarqawi in 2006, leading Al Qaeda 
affiliates established an entity known as the Islamic State of Iraq based in 
Iraq’s western Al Anbar province.  The group’s leaders, Abu Umar al 
Baghdadi and Abu Hamzah Al Muhajir, have since released a number of 
statements outlining the policies and goals of the new ‘Islamic state’ and 
attacking a number of Iraqi groups.  A ten-member cabinet was announced 
in April 2007.47 
That same report described an example of “bureaucratic competition” after Osama 
Bin Laden had condemned Arabs supporting Iraqi and coalition forces to suffer the same 
violent persecution as non-Arabs.  Subsequently, his top lieutenant, Al Zawahiri, and al 
Qaeda in Iraq leader Al Zarqawi demonstrated differing opinions on the outcome of 
targeting fellow Muslims based on secular affiliation.  “These differences became public 
in October 2005 after the publication of an intercepted letter reportedly written by Al 
Zawahiri to Al Zarqawi in which Al Zawahiri offered advice to Al Zarqawi on his 
campaign in Iraq.  Specifically, Al Zawahiri questioned the wisdom of pursuing a 
campaign against Shiite Iraqis on a sectarian basis when sectarian violence may reduce 
overall public support among the region’s Sunni Muslim population for Al Qaeda’s 
objectives.”48  Such strategy debate between Al Qaeda’s “bureaucrats” despite direction 
from the organization’s leader (Bin Laden) suggests that organizational behavior theory 
would provide useful analysis for non-state actors.   
Why is this important?  If it were true that a leader independently makes decisions 
that are explicitly executed by the entire terrorist organization, then all efforts to 
influence outcomes should focus exclusively on the leader.  On the contrary, assuming 
that bureaucratic theory applies to a non-state actor’s decision process, then each 
bureaucratic node would translate into points against which to apply pressure with the 
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purpose of influencing the overall outcome.  In other words, sub-actors within a terrorist 
network (based on their own desires, interpretations, and economic analysis) influence 
the organizational decisions that provide numerous avenues to assert influence.  This 
concept should incorporate those external entities supporting the group’s ability to sustain 
operations as well.  For example, elements providing safe havens, training, financial and 
material support to al Qaeda will attempt to influence the organization’s decision process 
as each would have personal interests and desires vested in the outcome.  To conclude, it 
is not necessary to assume perfect rationality.  If terrorists strategize or even consider 
outcomes when making decisions, and are at all sensitive to costs, they can be influenced. 
D. THE NON-STATE ACTOR SYSTEM 
Through the lens of organizational theory, violent non-state actors resemble a 
network of bureaucrats that can be influenced by threatening the group’s organizational 
goals and the individual interests of its members.  For these reasons, organizational 
theory provides the best model for determining methods to influence a non-state actor’s 
cost-benefit analysis because it provides a framework that encompasses the full spectrum 
of vulnerabilities.  Therefore, a strategy that employs methods to raise operational costs 
associated with these vulnerabilities would provide relevant targets for a deterrence 
policy. 
Considering non-state actors as organizations, Davis and Jenkins provide a 
representative model of the structure of a terrorist network, which they use as the basis 
for recommending an influence strategy.  Their strategy “emphasizes the fact that 
terrorists in a given group operate within a much larger system, some elements of which 
are potentially more vulnerable than others.”49  The work provides a fundamental and 
well-documented breakdown of the critical actors in a terrorist system (Figure 2) based 
on an organizational system approach. 
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Figure 2.   The actors in a terrorist system (From Davis and Jenkins)50 
Moreover, the targets identified in this model represent a non-state actor’s 
decision-makers and bureaucracy of the organization.  These actors provide the nodes-of-
influence whose vulnerabilities should be threatened to establish an effective deterrence 
policy. 
E. VULNERABILITIES OF THE NON-STATE ACTOR SYSTEM 
Retaliation is the most important aspect of punitive deterrence, encompassing a 
wide range of alternatives to threaten those one seeks to deter.  And, threatening vital 
nodes of the terrorist organization is the critical component of retaliation.  On one end of 
the spectrum, retaliation can take the form of law enforcement and judicial action to 
prosecute those caught through normal law enforcement processes.  On the other, the 
military could be employed to force regime change, as in the case of Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan.  This section explores methods to attack vulnerabilities 
associated with the nodes-of-influence identified above. 
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Intense examination of how a group operates, trains, communicates, and 
maintains funding provides information necessary to identify and threaten all critical 
nodes—not just the bombers.  Eric Herren argues that “we have to confront suicide 
terrorism at its origin, with the mastermind behind the attack—the trainers, the bomb 
factory and the terrorist shelters.”51  Hypothetically, analyzing a situation wherein Israel 
continues to sustain rocket attacks and suicide bombings, such a situation would imply 
that past forms of Israeli retaliation had not sufficiently deterred the enemy.  One possible 
explanation might be that the targets of retaliation are not sufficient centers of gravity 
because groups launching attacks do not rely exclusively on internal support.  This might 
imply that some third party or even one or more nation states could be supporting the 
terrorists.  Taking into consideration the retaliatory concept described above, deterring 
terrorist attacks on Israel would require a more holistic approach that threatens all of the 
elements required to sustain the violent campaign. 
Several approaches have been developed on this subject, and range from single 
focus strategies like attacking ideology to multi-faceted comprehensive strategies.  As 
some studies suggest, leaders are vulnerable to attacks on organizational goals like those 
published by Al Qaeda or the Brotherhood of Islam.  For example, Gary Servold notes 
that the Brotherhood of Islam had six main objectives and three long-term goals that 
could be threatened.52  Trager and Zagorcheva claim that even highly-motivated terrorists 
can be influenced by threatening their local agenda rather than individuals’ 
preservation.53  However, solely focusing on the leader may limit retaliatory options to a 
single rational-actor approach opposed to an organizational approach.  Therefore, 
additional methods would be necessary to attack vulnerabilities of the remaining actors 
and support networks. 
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A more effective strategy should derive targets from various vulnerabilities 
associated with the entire organizational structure.  These diverse strategies propose 
attacking objectives related to factors that enable a terrorist organization to thrive.  In a 
RAND study on counterterrorism, Blanchard suggests a four-prong strategy that globally 
attacks jihadist ideology, severs group links, denies sanctuaries, and provides support to 
states confronting local jihadist threats.54  Similarly, when testifying before Congress, 
Bruce Hoffman identified five elements of a counterterrorism strategy that include 
neutralizing the enemy, countering propaganda, and denying support.55   Colby proposes 
expanding the threat of retaliation to all those responsible: “supporters, facilitators, 
moneyman, back office workers, infrastructure, housing, food and other supplies, land, 
political control over territories, marks of prestige and so forth.”56  Whiteneck also 
suggests that deterrence should target societal elements and third-party supporters—like 
networks of financiers, supporters, scientists, and smugglers.57  He claims that “making 
the general populations aware that they might pay a large proportion of the costs of a 
terrorist attack against the United States may support the larger deterrent aims.”58  The 
counter to this argument contends that punishing non-complicit civilians only serves to 
legitimize the terrorists and strengthen their local support.59  To summarize, the literature 
suggests using methods to target vulnerabilities of the entire system through various 
means of punishment to maximize the deterrent effect.   
F. EVALUATION OF RECENT U.S. POLICY 
The counterterrorism strategies found in the 2006 National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism provide methods that the United States is employing against known 
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terrorists.  Found within the document’s list of long- and short-term objectives are several 
areas that potentially align with nodes for influencing non-state actors discussed above.  
These include targeting terrorists, financial components, means-of-communication, state 
support, and safe havens, waging a battle of ideas, and countering propaganda.60  The 
long-term strategy seeks to win the “war of ideas” through the spread of democracy to 
promote basic rights and freedoms for all people.  The goal is to counter the political 
alienation, injustices, subculture of misinformation, and radical ideology that cause the 
spread of terrorism.61  On the other hand, the short-term strategy focuses on preventing 
terrorist attacks by targeting the personnel and infrastructure of terrorist networks.  It 
emphasizes targeting the leaders to weaken the organization, prosecution of foot soldiers, 
disrupting recruitment, targeting communication and propaganda operations, and 
disrupting the flow of funds and weapons to terrorists.62  It also addresses terrorist’s 
means-of-travel and entry into the U.S. as a way of disrupting operations.  However, for 
any corporate entity requiring access to the U.S. for business, this could also serve as a 
threat of punishment for third-party support.  Furthermore, the Strategy to Combat 
Weapons of Mass Destruction alludes to the possibility of nuclear response in retaliation 
against guilty states and clearly signals intent to violate sovereignty with full military 
engagement.  These two documents provide the preponderance of policy guidance on 
counterterrorism efforts and signal the intentions of the United States.  Each of these 
methods is discussed in greater detail below to assess its relationship to vulnerabilities of 
the nodes-of-influence. 
1. Finance 
The first targeted vulnerability deals with financial support to non-state actors.  
Terrorist networks require a significant amount of funding to sustain infrastructure, 
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operations, training, and logistics.  Hence, attacking formal financial channels would 
force terrorists to rely on informal methods which slow and degrade their processes.63  
Areas may include targeting of charities, financial institutions, and material suppliers 
with actions to freeze assets, block transfers, and deny access to U.S. markets.64  As 
Levitt points out, attacking financial systems can deter “non-designated parties” from 
financing terrorists for fear of losing business, personal wealth and their reputations.65 
Non-state actors also utilize western nations for fund raising, material purchases 
and furthering political agendas.  For example, American charity organizations like the 
Holy Land Foundation and Muslim Arab Youth Association provided support to Hamas 
and families of suicide bombers, deportees and detainees.66   There is no question that 
laws of the state impact non-state actors’ fund raising activities, especially in the more 
permissive European countries.67  Davis recommends cutting off and exposing charities 
that support terrorist organizations and prosecuting those that knowingly finance 
terrorism.68 
Another important mechanism to combat terrorist finances is establishing a 
mechanism to globally block financial channels and seize funds of these organizations.  
For example, the United States successfully froze large amounts of Al Qaeda finances 
initially, but later lost control and funds started slipping back into the network.  
According to a Washington Post article, “in the months immediately following the 9/11 
attacks, the United States and other U.N. members moved to shut down Al Qaeda’s 
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financial network, freezing more than $112 million in assets.”69  However, the report 
goes on to say that despite these initial successes for counterterrorism efforts, al Qaeda 
has been able to maintain revenues streams of at least $30 million (with some estimates 
as high as $300M) from sources in Africa and Asia.70 
2. Communications and Propaganda 
According to principles of war, one of the most critical targets is the enemy’s 
command and control systems.  One method to target command and control is disrupting 
critical communication-links between terrorist leaders, commanders, financiers, and 
operatives.  This requires identifying and either isolating or taking control of terrorists’ 
means of communication, such as their access to the Internet, cell phones, and land lines.  
Admittedly, this is more difficult to accomplish against clandestine opponents that are 
integrated into mainstream societies or isolated in some remote area of the globe.  
However, it is clear that Al Qaeda has used faxes, audio-visual recordings, and the 
Internet for propaganda and communication for the past decade.71  Attacking available 
modes of communication would have a devastating effect on the group’s ability to 
conduct further operations.  For example, “global counterterrorism operations in the 
aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks appear to have limited Bin Laden’s 
ability to provide command and control leadership to Al Qaeda operatives and affiliated 
groups.”72 
Increasingly, the Internet has become the primary conduit for terrorist 
communications because it allows them to operate without personal exposure.73  “When 
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one looks at the recent attacks in Madrid and London, for example, it becomes clear that 
whether or not these cells were formally ‘connected’ to high-level jihadist operatives, 
these types of operations are analyzed and debated on jihadist Web sites and online 
forums.”74  Internet sites boasting jihadist and Salafist propaganda promoting radicalism 
and advocating violence should be targeted with cyber-warfare methods.  Brimley claims 
that countering the propaganda message should not forgo efforts to prevent its 
dissemination by blocking communication channels.75  Moreover, attacking terrorist 
means of promoting their agenda and violence would stifle them from achieving their 
political goals, another targeted vulnerability to be discussed later. 
3. Terrorist Network 
The process of attacking the network involves various methods to target 
individuals within the terrorist organization.  The purpose is to remove leaders and 
operatives from the network through law enforcement and military action.  This will 
degrade the network, demoralize the members, and diminish the organization’s ability to 
conduct operations and recruiting.76  Although some argue the ineffectualness of killing 
or capturing terrorist leaders because they are easily replaced by lieutenants, the validity 
of this argument is unclear.  Regardless of how fast someone steps into that leadership 
position, it is highly probable that the organization will suffer some sort of setback.  Also, 
a policy that threatens to kill or capture terrorist leaders will influence their decisions out 
of concerns for self-preservation.  It is evident that U.S. efforts to get Bin Laden have had 
a tremendous effect on his patterns, which degrades his ability to control the Al Qaeda 
organization.  After an evaluation of Bin Laden’s truce offer in 2006, most experts 
claimed that he lacked the power to convince the sub-networks of Al Qaeda to withdraw 
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from hostilities.77  The possibility that non-state actor systems are loosely organized 
highlights the importance of targeting the entire system and not just its leaders. 
Targeting operatives and complicit members also provides a deterrent effect by 
influencing the organization’s operational elements.  Again, potential methods would 
involve killing or capturing complicit members, but capturing may produce the most 
effective results for radical members with martyrdom desires.78  Arresting operational 
level terrorists and convicting them in a judicial system deprives them of benefiting from 
martyrdom and criminalizes their political aims.  Such second order effects could 
multiply if conviction is achieved within the judicial system accepted by the non-state 
actor rather than Western courts. 
4. Countering Political Goals 
Analyzing the strategic goals of a non-state actor may make it possible to target 
their political agenda.  Promoting democracy, attacking ideology with counter narratives, 
providing support to opposing regimes, and supporting moderate religious leaders are 
potential methods to attack political goals of terrorists.  Again turning to statements by Al 
Qaeda leaders, it is clear that Al Zawahiri fervently opposes the establishment of 
democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Al Zarqawi denounced Sunni participation in 
Iraq’s new government while condemning Shiite political organizations.79 
Terrorists wage war in the psychological realm and place enormous effort towards 
reaching the public with their message.  “Bin Laden and his deputies have personally 
stated their belief in the importance of harnessing the power of international and regional 
media for Al Qaeda’s benefit, and Al Qaeda’s central leadership structure has featured a 
dedicated media and communications committee tasked with issuing reports and 
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statements in support of the group’s operations.”80  Attacking ideology with counter-
narratives and disrupting communications would prevent the spread of ideology and work 
to discredit the message, both of which impair recruiting efforts.  Therefore, non-state 
actors would have to consider the negative impact on their political agendas before 
committing to terrorism.  Even for those groups already in conflict with American 
interests, it would have to be clear that the level of opposition to their political goals 
would significantly increase after an attack on the United States. 
Another way to target political aims is to provide incentives and support to those 
regimes that counter the goals and activities of the non-state actor.81  Evidence showing 
the importance of state actions to the goals of terrorists is found in statements by Bin 
Laden.  “In 2004 and 2006, Bin Laden personally addressed the governments and citizens 
of Europe and the United States directly in an effort to discourage further support for 
their respective foreign policies in the Islamic world.”82  Furthermore, successfully 
supporting the opposing regimes can cause the terrorists to turn on the population for not 
revolting, as in the case of Bin Laden’s criticism of the Islamic world for not answering 
the call to arms.83  This technique also pertains to providing support to moderate religious 
leaders of the terrorist’s sect, but who oppose violent expression. 
5. Non-State Support 
While efforts to destroy the terrorist organization, its means of communication, its 
finance, and its political goals cause significant damage to the operational system, they 
must be accompanied by efforts to also target supporting elements that turn 
organizational desires into reality.84  Non-state support is one such element that enables  
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terrorists to survive, thrive, and operate by providing resources, training, safe havens, and 
linkages to criminal networks.  Three subgroups of targets emerge from this category: 
supporting communities, businesses, and criminal organizations. 
It is often repeated that “all politics is local;” likewise, threats aligned with local 
issues could degrade community support.  Popular support from within the umma 
(seamless community) provides funding, a recruiting base, and legitimacy to threaten 
others.  Otherwise, terrorists must rely on states for support, which opens the door for 
state-level deterrence.85  Bin Laden has promoted the importance of local support with 
his repetitive appeals to “the silent ulema” (religious scholars), businesses, and 
community leaders to establish an alliance.86  Counter-societal targeting involves the use 
of kinetic and non-kinetic forms of retaliation against a populace for the purpose of 
deterrence.  Methods to influence these communities include controlling foreign aid, 
seizure of local assets for reparation, sanctions, business restrictions, visa denial, and 
destroying critical infrastructure. 
Furthermore, there exists a parallel, but covert, support network of criminal 
organizations that clandestinely provide weapons, materials, and funding sources to non-
state actors.  “Terrorists use gangs, drugs, prisons, money laundering, and smuggling 
networks to facilitate everything from recruitment to financing, material procurement, 
and operational support in the absence of a convenient state sanctuary.”87  Moreover, as 
difficult as it is to infiltrate a jihadist terrorist network, law enforcement agencies have 
been very successful when it comes to prosecuting operations against criminal 
organizations.88  Therefore, targeting criminal elements that support terrorists provides an 
effective method of deterring third party support. 
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6. State Support 
Retaliating against states that support terrorism is more straightforward, and 
incorporates military and diplomatic efforts to impose economic sanctions, destroy 
infrastructure, and force regime change.  Historic examples include economic sanctions 
on Iran for supporting Hamas, reparations from and air strikes on Libya, missile attacks 
on Sudan and Afghanistan for their support to Al Qaeda’s attack on U.S. embassies, and 
overthrow of the Taliban for their connection with the attacks on 9/11.  While the other 
targets being discussed can be difficult to identify or impose enforcement on, states are 
geographically bounded and possess easily identifiable targets to strike in retaliation.  For 
this reason, deterring state support appears to yield the most effective and straightforward 
threat, which increases the importance of methods that cut off non-state support. 
Additionally, since no organization in the world is purely self-sustaining, a second 
order effect may emerge where nations, financial institutions, and other entities begin to 
police terrorist activities for fear that they find themselves on the receiving end of 
retribution.  The key is to isolate terrorist organizations, choke off their resources and 
drive them to extinction.  For example, consider a hypothetical scenario in which a 
terrorist organization plans to use a particular country for safe haven, a certain financial 
institution to transfer funds, and a specific business as cover to travel to the U.S. for the 
purpose of detonating a nuclear bomb.  Now, suppose the known policy of the U.S. is that 
a nuclear attack on our homeland invokes all means necessary to execute the following 
forms of retaliation:  military retaliation against the supporting state, punishing all 
financial institutions involved, and destroying the culpable businesses.  Then, intuitively 
self-preservation will discourage nations from providing weapons and safe havens to 
terrorists, financial institutions will rigorously monitor transactions, and foreign 
companies will better scrutinize employees that travel to the U.S.  In other words, 
deterrence helps prevent terrorism by threatening to destroy those third-party elements 
necessary for terrorist organizations to operate. 
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7. Nuclear Retaliation 
The last form of retaliation and by far the most controversial involves state and 
counter-societal targeting.  Although this could be conducted to a lesser extent with 
conventional weapons, traditional deterrence methods threaten nuclear retaliation.  In 
order to utilize nuclear weapons in retaliation for an attack, the punisher would have to 
not only be certain of attribution, but also with some level of conviction attribute blame 
to the supporting society as nuclear weapons do not discriminate.  Experts like Stephen 
Younger mostly agree that nuclear weapons serve only to deter states and present an 
ineffective tool for deterring non-state actors.89  Obviously, nuclear retaliation has very 
limited applications like response to a WMD attack, but still warrants deliberation when 
establishing deterrence policy.  This issue is revisited in discussion of the nuclear attack 
scenario when analyzing probable U.S. response options. 
Congruent across all of these strategies is that their efficacy depends upon gaining 
knowledge of the enemy.  As Sun Tzu, the great Chinese strategist, once postulated, “By 
perceiving the enemy and perceiving ourselves, there will be no unforeseen risk in any 
battle.”90  Information gathered on actual non-state actors would provide the specific 
details on a terrorist organization that are needed to execute these retaliation methods on 
real targets.  Nevertheless, a deterrence policy only has to make the reality of punishment 
self-evident to non-state actors. 
G. COMPARISON OF POLICY THREATS TO VULNERABILITIES 
To validate current policy strategy, the aforementioned threats are compared to 
targets of retaliation from the theoretical model above.  Below, the vulnerabilities 
extracted from literature on deterring terrorism are correlated to their associated centers  
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of gravity from Davis and Jenkins’ model to establish targets of retaliation.  Next, current 
counterterrorism methods from U.S. policy are compared to those targets to determine 
effectiveness.  Table 1 illustrates the results of this qualitative comparison. 
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Terrorist Centers of Gravity
(Nodes-of-influence) 
Targets of Reprisal 
(Vulnerabilities) 
Recent U.S. Policy Threats 
(U.S. Counterterrorism Strategies) 
-Influence the organization’s decision 
makers (Leaders/Lieutenants) 
Attack political goals & 
ideology 
-Democracy (promote rights and freedoms) 
-Battle of ideas (counter-narrative campaign) 
-Terrorist network (kill or capture members) 
-Influence those that execute the 
operations 
(Foot soldiers) 
Attack terrorist system -Terrorist network (kill or capture members) -Communications (disrupt command and control) 
-Counter efforts to elicit support and 
recruit membership 
(Recruiting) 
Counter terrorists’ propaganda -Propaganda (counter-narrative campaign) -Communications (cyber warfare) 
-Discourage financial support and 
disrupt financial transactions 
(Financiers) 
Attack supply of funds 
-Finance (seize assets, penalize donators, etc.) 
-Communications (charity advertisements) 
-Travel (restrict business travel to U.S.) 
-De-legitimize religious base for 
radicalism and terrorism 
(Religious figures) 
Counter radical ideology -Battle of ideas (counter-narrative campaign) - Democracy (promote rights and freedoms) 
-Isolate terrorists from state support and 
deny them sanctuaries 
(Rogue states) 
Attack supporting nation states 
-State support (economic sanctions/insurgency) 
-Safe havens (locate and destroy) 
-Military (regime change/nuclear retaliation) 
-Isolate terrorists from community 
support and anonymity 
(Popular or non-state support) 
Attack societal supporters 
-Counter-societal targeting 
-Finance (seize assets, cut-off aid, etc.) 
-Travel (restrict access to U.S.) 
Table 1.   Comparison of theoretical targets and policy threats
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As evidenced by the table, the current threats contained in U.S. policy effectively 
target most of the vulnerabilities that were identified as having the potential to influence a 
non-state system.  For example, an effective counter narrative strategy aligns with 
targeting radical propaganda, which impacts the non-state actor’s ability to recruit. 
One problem with using these counterterrorism strategies for deterrence is that the 
United States currently employs these methods no matter what terrorists do.  This is in 
contradiction to a principle of deterrence noted by Thomas Schelling, which points out 
that effective deterrence not only requires a threat of punishment for aggression, but also 
a promise of restraint for compliance.91  For example, the United States has continued to 
persecute al Qaeda with all of the counterterrorism strategies discussed above regardless 
of their current activities, which gives them little incentive to consider future restraint.  
Conversely, the fact that, since al Qaeda’s attack, the United States has been continually 
delivering punishment does help show resolve to any other non-state actors considering 
future attacks. 
Clearly, after an attack, deterrence requires the United States to deliver promised 
retaliation to reestablish a deterrence posture. However, a broad strategy of seeking to 
eradicate all global terrorism does complicate efforts to institute a strategy aimed at 
deterring non-state actors yet to commit an attack.  For the latter, a deterrence posture 
will require finding ways to signal limits on U.S. actions against groups that do not attack 
the U.S. homeland or cross other U.S. red lines, combined with a commitment to execute 
retaliatory responses if a new group does carry out an attack.  In the case of al Qaeda, the 
United States could continue to pursue and persecute those leaders, operatives, and third 
party supporters involved in the 9/11 attacks, while promising to leave other financiers 
and community and government sympathizers alone providing there are no further 
attacks on the Unites States.  Otherwise, future deterrence of al Qaeda would have to rely 
on escalatory threats where punishment invoked in response to 9/11 would be taken to a  
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new level for a subsequent attack.  With either of these strategies, U.S. deterrence policy 
must include some promise of restraint if non-state actors refrain from attacking U.S. 
interests, or the terrorists will see no benefit for compliance. 
H. CONCLUSION 
Arguably, the most difficult challenge in forming a credible retaliation policy for 
non-state actors is identifying exploitable vulnerabilities.  The deterrer must identify 
actors that constitute the nodes which influence decisions and operations of the terrorist 
organization.  As Figure 1 illustrated, effectively targeting the vulnerabilities of each 
node should have an effect on the organization’s decisions.  Non-state actors must 
maintain key elements of survival: safe havens, anonymity, financial backing, means of 
travel, and means of communications, to name a few.92  These vulnerabilities provide 
targets to threaten with retaliation by all elements of national power:  diplomacy, 
intelligence, clandestine operations, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, 
public diplomacy, and homeland defense.93  As a result of these threats, non-state actors 
will weigh the benefits of attacking the U.S. against the losses they will sustain from that 
response.  The main target of this deterrence is non-state actors that have yet to attack the 
United States.  Once the line has been crossed, deterrence has lapsed, and the violator 
becomes the target of retaliation. 
To summarize, this chapter supports the claim that non-state actors have goals and 
assets that, when appropriately threatened, could cause them to make responsive 
decisions to avoid loss.   Also, the results of this theoretical approach suggest that current 
U.S. policy does contain relevant targets for retaliation against appropriate vulnerabilities 
of terrorist centers of gravity.  However, it is important to point out that there are limits to 
the availability of targets based on U.S. public support.  As with any strategy, the nation’s 
population must be willing and able to achieve its objectives.  For example, striking a 
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societal target may have a desirable impact on an important center of gravity, but public 
support could constrain that option based on how it judges the morality of such reprisal.  
Therefore, signaling a method of reprisal that does not meet this parameter undermines 
the credibility of threat and therefore fails to meet the prerequisites for deterrence.  
Therefore, the next step in evaluating the U.S. deterrence posture is to analyze the 
credibility of these deterrent threats from this perspective. 
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III. EVALUATION OF RESPONSES FOR A CYBER ATTACK 
Safeguarding the American people also includes the preservation of the 
Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR). As set forth in 
the 2006 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), critical 
infrastructure includes the assets, systems, and networks, whether physical 
or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or 
destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic 
security, public health or safety, or any combination thereof. Key 
resources are publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the 
minimal operations of the economy and government. By protecting 
CI/KR, we further protect the American people and build a safer, more 
secure, and more resilient Nation. 
The 2006 National Strategy for Homeland Security94 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In August of 2003, an isolated problem at an Ohio utility company cascaded into 
power outages across eight states and most of Ontario, Canada, leaving 50 million people 
without power for several days.  The “Northeast Blackout of 2003,” as it was termed, 
affected some 265 power plants and cost an estimated six billion dollars.95  If such an 
incident could result from an accident at one utility, one can only imagine the catastrophe 
that a well-planned terrorist attack on critical infrastructure would cause. 
While some experts insist that defensive measures are the solution to preventing 
attacks on the eighteen critical infrastructures identified in the U.S. National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (2009), in reality, there are not enough resources or time 
available to secure all of the ever-changing vulnerabilities associated with these systems.  
Even the most outspoken supporters of protection seek to deal with this reality by 
incorporating risk management methods to determine how best to distribute the finite 
amount of resources available for this endeavor.  Unsurprisingly, the main argument 
against this defensive approach simply points out that it is impossible to protect 
everything.  Although protective efforts might deter terrorists from attacking a hardened 
                                                 




target, they do not preclude terrorists from exploiting the unprotected soft targets 
instead.96  Furthermore, since America arguably has an infinite number of vulnerabilities, 
attempting to secure all of them would be an ineffective use of national treasure that, in 
the end, could prove economically disastrous for the nation.97  These limitations suggest 
that deterring terrorist attacks by threat of punishment provides a logical supplement to 
the aforementioned strategy because it can address gaps that will remain—despite the 
nation’s best efforts to secure a limitless number of targets or disrupt covert operations.  
Therefore, the United States should use the threat of punishment to influence terrorists’ 
will to commit attacks on the nation’s critical infrastructure to supplement the limitations 
of defensive strategies.  This reality is no different than the outcome of decisions by 
leaders faced with a similar dilemma during the nuclear arms race—defense is not an 
answer unto itself.  By establishing an effective and credible message aimed specifically 
at deterring attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources, the United States can 
encourage non-state actors to consider the unacceptable consequences of these types of 
attacks and choose an alternate course of action to further their goals.   
In this chapter, I attempt to determine the likely responses to a cyber attack on 
U.S. critical infrastructure by a non-state actor and examine the credibility of policy 
threats related to this scenario.  The intent is to evaluate the retaliation options 
substantiated in chapter two as potential responses to a hypothetical scenario.  I will 
begin with a review of relevant policy documents to discuss the current strategies on 
deterring this type of terrorism.  Through this I will also identify any threats contained 
within current strategy that would specifically signal U.S. intent to non-state actors 
contemplating attacks on America’s critical infrastructures.  Next, I present a realistic 
scenario that illustrates the events and actors involved in a cyber attack on the United 
States.  The scenario will depict an act of cyber-terrorism on the nation’s critical 
infrastructure by a non-state actor that causes severe damage and significant financial 
loss.  Through analysis of that event, I will derive a list of potential targets for reprisal 
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based on the enablers and culpable actors involved in the attack.  Then, I will determine 
whether these threats are valid responses in light of the consequences of the given attack.  
And finally, I will compare the methods of punishment validated in chapter two with 
potential targets derived from the scenario in order to analyze their credibility based on 
effectiveness and political support.  If the threats declared in U.S. policy do not threaten 
influential targets or would reasonably fail to garner political support, then presumably 
the threats would lack credibility. 
To provide a common frame of reference, the 2006 National Strategy to Combat 
Terrorism defines critical infrastructure as “systems and assets so vital that their 
destruction or incapacitation would have a debilitating effect on the security of our 
Nation.”98  It lists critical infrastructures and key resources as: energy, food and 
agriculture, water, telecommunications, public health, transportation, the defense 
industrial base, government facilities, postal and shipping, the chemical industry, 
emergency services, monuments and icons, information technology, dams, commercial 
facilities, banking and finance, and nuclear reactors, materials, and waste.99  While this 
opens the possibilities to countless scenario options, this study is narrowed to analysis of 
an attack on the banking and financial sector to illustrate the effects of a catastrophic 
attack on critical infrastructure without human casualties. 
An important component that should be addressed before proceeding is the issue 
of attribution.  Clearly, attribution plays a significant role in any punishment strategy, but 
cyber-terror attribution may prove extremely difficult, if not impossible.  “The speed and 
anonymity of cyber attacks makes distinguishing among the actions of terrorists, 
criminals, and nation states difficult, a task which often occurs only after the fact, if at 
all.”100  Even if the evidence is traced back to a certain computer at a specific location, it 
still does not prove who was sitting behind keyboard at the time of attack.  However, I  
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will assume either successful attribution or that terrorists will claim responsibility for an 
attack on the premise that some of the benefits of terrorism are lost in anonymity, so as to 
analyze the relevance of retaliation options.  
B. RECENT U.S. POLICY THREATS 
This section analyzes the most recent policy documents available at the time of 
writing.  These were mostly released in the second term of the George W. Bush 
administration, but it is not expected that U.S. strategy for deterring terrorism will change 
greatly with the new Obama administration.  In general, these policies give primary 
emphasis to the goal of defeating terrorism.  Although the preponderance of strategic 
guidance pertains to methods that seek to prevent and defend against terrorist attacks, the 
strategies also incorporate statements that signal intent to punish offenders ex post.  For 
example, the 2006 National Security Strategy proposes to cut off radical leaders from 
their supporting networks and mentions deterring those elements from further 
collaboration.101  As a pinnacle document of U.S. strategy, it provides overarching 
guidance on preventing terrorist attacks and the importance of deterrence, but it lacks any 
direct reference to the importance of deterring attacks on critical infrastructure. 
On the other hand, the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security dedicates 
an entire section to critical infrastructure protection with emphasis on establishing a 
deterrent posture.  Overall, the document’s strategy for critical infrastructure focuses on 
building resiliency and protecting the various components in order to invoke deterrence 
through denial by reducing the probability of success.102  However, it does not discard 
punitive deterrence altogether; rather it points to the limitations when dealing with 
terrorism.  The section addressing punitive deterrence declares the desire to alter the 
terrorist’s calculus and it clearly articulates the intended audiences—state sponsors, 
terrorist groups, and other non-state actors who support terrorism.103  Furthermore, it 
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discusses actual methods to retaliate, such as alienating supporters, prosecuting terrorists, 
launching counter-narrative campaigns, and pursuing global engagement.104 
It also highlights America’s growing vulnerability to cyber attacks and notes that 
critical infrastructure “relies on the uninterrupted use of the Internet and the 
communications systems, data, monitoring, and control systems that comprise [its] cyber 
infrastructure.”105  Cyber infrastructure not only provides a powerful medium to help 
non-state actors conduct their internal operations, it also provides a conduit for terrorists, 
criminal hackers, and foreign governments alike to globally attack a nation’s economy, 
its citizens, and its defense systems.  A severe cyber-terrorism attack could seriously 
impact the “highly interdependent” critical infrastructure systems, thereby weakening the 
national economy and security.106 
Two additional policy documents directly address the topic of critical 
infrastructure protection initiatives of the Homeland Security strategy:  the 2003 National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and the 2003 National Strategy for the Physical Protection 
of Critical Infrastructure.  The Cyberspace strategy document provides details on specific 
vulnerabilities and guidance on protective measures to prevent attacks and mitigate their 
effects.   Also, it also touches on the need to strengthen law enforcement, 
counterintelligence and attribution capabilities as well as foster international unity against 
cybercrime.107 The Physical Security Strategy document primarily focuses on the 
physical protection of critical infrastructure across the spectrum of public and private 
sectors.  This document also highlights the interdependence of these infrastructure 
systems by reaffirming that a debilitating attack on one could cascade across multiple 
systems.108 
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Finally, the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism signals the threats of 
U.S. response to terrorism (detailed in chapter two) as:  attacking ideology; targeting 
leaders, foot soldiers, propaganda, weapons and communication; disrupting recruitment 
and material and financial support; and waging a war of ideas through democratization 
and promoting freedom.109  Although this document provides the preponderance of 
specificity on methods to combat terrorists, it does not associate any threat of retaliation 
distinctively for an attack on critical infrastructure.  Instead, it echoes the Department of 
Homeland Security’s reliance on a defensive strategy for protecting U.S. critical 
infrastructure.  Overall, the aforementioned policies lean heavily on protection methods 
and do not signal specific reprisal for attacks on critical infrastructure.  Nonetheless, such 
attacks would still be characterized as acts of terrorism and therefore would presumably 
invoke the counterterrorism measures listed in Table 1.  
C. CYBER-TERRORISM SCENARIO 
The 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace describes cyberspace as the 
nervous system of the nation’s critical infrastructures.110  While U.S. critical 
infrastructure has yet to suffer the level of attack that would warrant a national level 
deterrence strategy, it is continually subjected to smaller-scale cyber attacks, which 
expose its vulnerabilities.  These attacks have been either criminal in nature or non-
destructive probing and data mining by competing nation-states.  Nevertheless, while 
cyber-terrorism has yet to cause severe damage or financial loss, cybercrime currently 
deprives the U.S. economy of $200 million to a billion or more per year (estimates vary 
by how financial loss is measured).111  Regardless of the figure, critical infrastructures 
such as the financial sector, electrical grid and national defense systems provide lucrative 
targets with vulnerabilities susceptible to cyber terrorism. 
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The 2004 National Planning Scenarios, developed by the Homeland Security 
Council and Homeland Security Department, describe potential disasters that would 
cause catastrophic damage to the United States.  Within this document’s fifteen national 
emergencies is a realistic scenario in which a non-state actor attacks the nation’s critical 
infrastructure.  In this scenario, a non-state actor uses a clandestine computer network 
from outside the country to conduct a cyber-based attack on critical infrastructure 
accessible through the global Internet.112  The scenario demonstrates how a cyber attack 
on the financial sector can undermine confidence in the nation’s banking system, 
resulting in severe economic disruption and financial damages. 
The scenario begins with leaders of a non-state organization strategizing to 
commit cyber terrorism on the financial sector in order to severely degrade the national 
economy.  The terrorist leaders assemble a team of computer hackers to develop an 
operational plan to infiltrate and exploit the main computer databases of major credit card 
companies.  Their primary target is the credit-card processing facilities, which are highly 
interconnected with the U.S. banking system.   
To set the plan in motion, the terrorists establish a network operations center in a 
location permissive to cybercrime, in other words, where unmonitored financial transfers 
and unregulated communications are possible.  Financial and material supporters provide 
the necessary computer equipment, communications links, and funding to establish a 
powerful computer network.  From this location, the hackers begin a long period of 
undetected and non-destructive attacks on the targeted systems in order to determine 
vulnerabilities, which are then exploited by planting malicious code that will perform a 
specific function at the prescribed time.  Simultaneously, the team constructs an 
encrypted attack network consisting of thousands of bots (innocent zombie computers on 
the network) that are populated with undetectable software.  This attack network will be 
used to shut-down Internet hubs that interconnect the bank’s computer systems to further 
disrupt service and degrade response capabilities.   
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When everything is in place and ready, the leaders decide to execute the plan on 
the eve of Thanksgiving—hours before the biggest shopping day of the year, Black 
Friday.  During the attack, terrorists steal credit card numbers from multiple credit-card 
processing facilities and post them on the Internet.  This causes the cancellation of 20 
million cards that unsuspecting people intend to innocently use the next morning.  A 
daisy chain of events causes automated tellers to shut down across the country, payroll 
systems of large corporations to fail, and major investment management companies to 
shutdown.  As a result, “citizens no longer trust any part of the U.S. financial system and 
foreign speculators make a run on the dollar.” 113  All of which causes the U.S. economy 
to fall into a long-term crisis.  While this may sound like a science fiction, the reality of 
this type of attack was confirmed in 2007 when Chinese cyber spies stole a significant 
amount of defense research and development data from the computer systems of a U.S. 
company through a very similar process.114 
D. POTENTIAL TARGETS OF RETALIATION 
Analysis of this attack yields fewer targets for retaliation than would a mass-
casualty bombing because it requires a smaller number of operatives, limited 
transnational travel and less logistical support.  Nevertheless, members of the terrorist 
network (leaders and foot soldiers) are potential targets of retribution.  In this case 
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specifically, the attack is carried out by computer hackers who are most likely culpable 
actors, but could include a few unwitting cyber criminals that performed a small function 
in the larger plan.  Regardless, they would still warrant punishment as terrorist supporters 
if not active members.  Financial and material supporters both legitimate and criminal 
provide additional targets for retribution efforts.  These would include legitimate 
companies and institutions that knowingly do business with terrorists and criminal 
organizations that supply weapons and materials on the black-market.  The command and 
control system, especially the communications network and facilities enabling the attack, 
provides the only hard targets for retaliation.  As with most terrorist groups, the strategic 
goals of the organization are susceptible to attacks that counter those goals and derail 
their political agenda.  Lastly, community and state supporters enable the non-state actor 
to operate with impunity by providing a location from which to base its operations and 
covertly commit a cyber-attack.  These targets comprise the retaliation options that would 
be most effective for this type of attack. 
E. EVALUATION OF POSSIBLE RESPONSES 
In order to determine the effectiveness of the policy threats validated as relevant 
forms of retaliation in chapter two, they are compared to the list of targets from the 
analysis above.  To recall, the policy threats were extracted from the counterterrorism 
strategies found in the national strategy documents of the United States.  These policy 
threats are evaluated in the context of this scenario to determine their credibility as a 
response to a cyber attack on critical infrastructure. 
Since this attack might lead to hundreds of millions of dollars in immediate 
financial loss and send the nation’s economy into a depression, public support for a 
national response is almost certainly garnered.  However, the outcry for justice would not 
compare to that in reaction to the attacks on 9/11.  The nation would undoubtedly wage a 
war of ideas by countering the terrorist’s ideology and propaganda while also seeking to 
discredit the organization and its leaders.  The U.S. could launch an all out information 
campaign that promotes counter-narratives and exposes the negative aspects of the 
terrorist organization.  The battleground would include any region in which the 
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organization seeks to influence local communities, and include a global engagement 
strategy that seeks to dominate information sources on the Internet. 
Also, there would be little resistance to hunting down the terrorist leaders and 
operatives directly responsible for the attack, but it is highly unlikely that Americans 
would support a “kill or capture” policy for an act of cyber terrorism that does not 
directly cause casualties when one considers that there is opposition to the death penalty 
for criminals convicted of murder.  In the same sense, killing terrorists for non-lethal 
crimes would not correlate to the American sense of moral justice.  Considering this 
caveat would, theoretically, eliminate any retaliation option that targets individuals with 
lethal methods for this scenario.  The more realistic form of punishment for complicit 
individuals would be a transnational law-enforcement operation to bring them to justice.  
Additionally, the U.S. would seek retribution against the financial supporters and systems 
that contributed to the attack.  For example, the U.S. could expose and discredit any 
charities and businesses that support the group as well as prosecute those complicit in the 
attack.  It could also seize any existing financial resources connected to the organization 
and pursue financial investors for reparations. 
Another threat to evaluate for this scenario is retaliation against non-state 
supporters, or counter-societal targeting.  In this case, punishing the community that is 
providing a hospitable environment or providing popular support presents some 
complications.  The U.S. could cut off aid or impose economic penalties on the local 
community and law enforcement could pursue complicit individuals from that 
community.  However, any benefit gained from punishing the community at large would 
not offset the audience costs of targeting “innocent” civilians in retaliation for monetary 
damages alone.  Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that the American people would 
support any form of retaliation that involved taking human lives in response to an attack 
that only inflicted financial havoc on America.   
The scenario does illustrate how state support can contribute to a successful attack 
by providing a permissive environment for cyber crime and safe haven for terrorist 
organizations.  However, attacking every safe haven could prove difficult for cases of 
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cyber-terrorism because terrorist hackers can use virtual safe havens which are not 
geographically bound to each other or the terrorist network.115  Also, gaining consensus 
to punish the supporting nation-state by forcing a regime change would be more 
challenging than it would in response to a more graphic attack that inflicted severe 
damage and mass casualties.  A cyber attack of this magnitude might bring together 
international support for economic sanctions aimed at forcing the guilty state to 
strengthen its cyber laws and enforcement measures.  However, considering the 
opposition America faces when seeking sanctions against nuclear-proliferation violators 
and rogue states (e.g., Russian and Chinese resistance to sanctions on Iran and North 
Korea), convincing the international community to pass sanctions for a cyber-attack 
poses uncertainties that further reduce the threat’s credibility. 
The least contentious targets and most susceptible to military strikes are the 
communications networks and platforms enabling the attack as well as the terrorists’ 
command and control facilities.  First, retaliation against terrorist facilities aligns quite 
well with the U.S. military’s capabilities, and would represent a direct attack on the 
terrorists’ capabilities.  On the other hand, communication systems involved in this attack 
start at the terrorists’ lair but end at the U.S. cyber infrastructure.  In response to this 
scenario, targeting of communications would be limited to the facilities and systems of 
the supporting state because it afforded the permissive environment to infiltrate the global 
network.  Retaliation against communications could come in the form of state isolation 
(blocking all cyber traffic from that nation) or physical attacks on its communications 
infrastructure.  While the second could be accomplished by various means, it opens the 
door for one possible use of nuclear weapons in retaliation for cyber terrorism. 
Obviously, with this type of attack, the U.S. would not resort to nuclear retaliation 
against the state or community supporters in the direct sense.  But, the U.S. could feasibly 
detonate a nuclear weapon at high altitude to create an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that 
would destroy all electronic devices in the geographical region where the attack 
originated.  Given the reluctance of international norm-abiding nations to break the 
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nuclear taboo, this method of destroying the enemy’s cyber capabilities, while 
realistically effective, would meet political resistance.  Therefore, the use of nuclear 
weapons for EMP strikes would require additional research and analysis before 
definitively adding it to the list of viable retaliation options. 
For simplicity, the results of this comparison are summarized in Table 2:  The 
current counterterrorism policy method (threat) is considered relevant if it correlates with 










Evaluation of Policy 
Threats for Cyber Scenario 
Credible
? 
Battle of ideas/Democracy Political goals, propaganda, and recruiting Yes Information operations campaign Yes 
Target terrorist network Leaders, members, hackers Yes Kill or capture terrorists, sever links, restrict travel No* 
Target finance Financiers, charities, businesses, communities Yes 
Seize assets, shutdown charities, 
seek financial reparations Yes 
Target communications Command and control system Yes Disrupt communications capabilities Yes 
Deny weapons Computer and network systems Yes Target terrorist network capabilities Yes 
Target state sponsor Permissive state Yes Seek regime change/sanctions for cyber attack  No 
Target safe havens Base of operations, network control center Yes Military strikes Yes 
Nuclear retaliation  Permissive state Yes Nuclear retaliation (EMP may be an alternative option) No** 
* Public would not support a kill or capture policy for an attack the only causes infrastructure and monetary damage 
** While this type of attack would not generate the “national will” to employ nuclear weapons, EMP retaliation is possible 
Table 2.   Evaluation of U.S. policy in response to cyber terrorism 
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The first two columns illustrate the correlation between policy objectives and 
relevant targets for this scenario.  It suggests that the punishment methods described in 
counterterrorism strategy clearly align with potential targets of the terrorist system.   The 
next two columns suggest that not all of the associated threats of retaliation for those U.S. 
policy targets are credible responses for a cyber attack on the nation’s critical 
infrastructure.  As discussed above, suggestions that the United States might respond with 
overwhelming military force, or especially with nuclear weapons, are not credible 
deterrent threats for a cyber attack on critical infrastructure. 
F. CONCLUSION 
In practice, the retaliation methods for an act of cyber terror would obviously pale 
in comparison to the response for the 9/11 attacks by al Qaeda.  Therefore, one could 
reasonably assume that the U.S. would implement a less significant response.  While 
some of the current threats appear plausible in retaliation for a cyber attack (e.g., 
terrorists, finance, and communications), the analysis suggests that the U.S. cannot 
credibly threaten all of the targets described in recent policy.  Although these threats 
would not be reasonable responses to this scenario, current policy does not differentiate 
retaliatory options by type of attack.  It signals the intent to punish all acts of terrorism by 
pursuing all of the aforementioned counterterrorism measures against all of the targets 
identified. 
A United States response to this scenario would most likely embrace measures 
that focus retaliatory efforts at the terrorist system and the cyber network enabling the 
attack.  Attacking the terrorist system would include trying to capture all terrorist leaders, 
members, and direct supporters to bring them before the justice system for punishment.  
It would also target all sources and channels of financial backing by seeking to arrest 
those complicit in the attack, seize funds for reparations, and shutdown guilty businesses 
and charities.  Finally, the communications systems, hardware, facilities, and networks 
involved in the attack would be disabled or destroyed in order to not only prevent future 
attacks, but to punish permissive states and companies that fail to police their systems. 
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However, the response would most likely exclude a policy to kill terrorists, use 
the military to force regime change, or impose counter-societal targeting as methods of 
punishment for this type of attack.  For example, there would be resistance to a “kill or 
capture” strategy for punishing terrorists.  Depending on the type of attack this threat 
lacks credibility—it may be effective for a 9/11 type attack, but not for a cyber attack.  
The same case can be made with state-level retaliation, where regime change may be an 
extreme punishment for cyber-terror, but support for a domestic opposition’s peaceful bid 
for power would not.  Finally, community support provides a potential target in this 
scenario, but the method of punishment in policy is unclear and could be interpreted to 
signal counter-societal targeting rather than a lesser form of punishment such as severing 
financial aid.   
This suggests that some punishment measures are too vaguely threatened or 
directed at general targets, and therefore incredible forms of retaliation.  Just as criminal 
law assigns a degree of punishment based on the type of crime and consequence, 
deterrent threats must clearly articulate the associated punishment to the type of attack.  
Therefore, threats against these targets would have to include more specificity about the 
methods of punishment to be credible. 
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IV. EVALUATION OF RESPONSES FOR A NUCLEAR ATTACK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Anders Corr claims that with a probability of nearly 50 percent over the next ten 
years, nuclear terror poses a threat with 100 times more destructive potential than Pearl 
Harbor and 9/11 combined.116  By establishing a sound and credible deterrent policy the 
United States can articulate the costs it would impose after such an attack on non-state 
actors and states that support them, in the hope of dissuading them from attempting such 
an attack.  More importantly, when considering the United States’ responses to previous 
attacks on American soil, it appears likely that the U.S. response to a nuclear attack 
would be both formidable and inevitable.  Hence, not devising a credible threat policy for 
deterrence would waste the ex ante benefits of an ex post reality.117  This raises two 
important questions: what threats does current U.S. strategy signal to non-state actors 
contemplating nuclear terror and are they credible? 
Through a qualitative process I attempt to examine these questions and determine 
the likely responses to a nuclear attack on the United States.  First, I will review existing 
policy to explore the current strategies on deterring nuclear terrorism.  Next, I present a 
hypothetical scenario to illustrate a conceivable nuclear attack on the United States by a 
non-state actor.  The scenario will illustrate an attack in which a transnational 
organization manages to acquire or construct a nuclear bomb which is then detonated 
within the United States resulting in mass destruction and significant casualties.  Through 
analysis of the event, I will derive a list of relevant retribution targets based on the 
enablers and culpable actors involved in the attack.  Next, I will discuss the methods of 
punishment described in counterterrorism policy, then analyze their effectiveness and 
practicality based on the relevant targets derived from the scenario and expected public 
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support.  Finally, the results are tabulated in order to compare them to the results from the 
critical infrastructure attack scenario of Chapter III. 
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
The question that immediately comes to the forefront of this discussion is whether 
the United States would use nuclear weapons in retaliation for an act of nuclear terrorism.  
No question, the nuclear arsenal currently supports America’s strategic deterrence policy 
to prevent other nation-states from threatening its sovereignty and plays a significant role 
in extended deterrence for its allies, but it is unclear if the use of nuclear weapons would 
be a realistic option for response to an attack by a non-state actor.  As Paul Kapur 
suggests, nuclear retaliation in response to a nuclear attack on the United States is 
entirely plausible, when considering its Cold War policy to launch nuclear attacks on the 
Soviet Union for a conventional attack on Europe.118  However, the Soviet Union was a 
nation-state with a government responsible for acting on behalf of its citizens, making 
counter-societal targeting seemingly more justifiable than a situation with non-state 
actors and dispersed supporters.  Stephen Younger claims that nuclear weapons serve 
only to deter states and present an ineffective tool for deterring non-state actors.119  A 
significant amount of literature debates its plausibility, but most experts agree that even 
for an act of nuclear terror, nuclear retaliation would be limited to punishment of states if 
they were complicit in the attack.  This question is revisited after discussion of a nuclear 
attack scenario in the analysis of probable U.S. response options. 
However, an important component that should be addressed before proceeding is 
the issue of attribution.  Clearly, attribution plays a significant role in any punishment 
strategy, but even more so when considering the possible response to a nuclear attack.  
For the victim to deliver true justice, the guilty party must be identified before it can be 
punished.  The United States would have to be able to determine the source of nuclear 
material and the liable actors to respond with large-scale conventional retaliation or 
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nuclear weapons against societal targets.  Several U.S. policy documents recognize this 
issue, stating that America must “refine the ability to define the nature, source, and 
perpetrator of an attack” and “ensure that our capacity to determine the source of any 
attack is well-known, and that our determination to respond overwhelmingly to any 
attack is never in doubt.”120  Michael Miller calls for improvements to nuclear 
attribution, stating that successful attribution in itself creates a deterrent effect because it 
removes the terrorists’ and supporters’ anonymity.121  The National Strategy to Combat 
Weapons of Mass Destruction echoes these points and establishes policy initiatives to 
field new capabilities for rapid attribution and robust strike capability.122  Here, I will 
hold this variable constant by assuming that either attribution will be possible after an 
attack or terrorists will claim responsibility so as to maximize the benefits of their attack. 
Additionally, this discussion assumes that terrorists possess the will and potential 
to obtain nuclear weapons, and simply postulates that an effective deterrent strategy aims 
to dissuade terrorists that have a desire for acquisition.  The first part of this assumption 
is founded on declaratory statements from terrorist organizations like al Qaeda and 
recorded attempts by Aum Shinrikyo to obtain and use Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) technology, but the second premise involves the more widely-debated issue of 
access.  The difficulty in acquiring protected WMD materials and technology provides an 
opportunity for external influences to attack the supply-side of proliferation. 
Counter-proliferation strategies attempt to prevent an attack by employing a 
strategy of deterrence by denial that seeks to deny terrorists the means to acquire WMD, 
regardless of their will to possess.  For example, Auerswald claims that preventing WMD 
transfer remains the most important goal and suggests implementing a denial strategy 
aimed at transnational criminal organizations and traffickers under an international law 
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framework.123  In other words, a counter-proliferation strategy attempts to control the 
supply of WMD materials.  In contrast, a punishment strategy seeks to influence and 
manipulate the demand side of the WMD transfer process by reducing the desire for these 
weapons.  Colby argues that WMD proliferation is inevitable and trying to prevent it a 
waste of resources, therefore deterring attacks remains the preeminent strategy that, if 
effective, would reduce incentive for acquiring WMD.124  Although counter-proliferation 
is neither completely effective against nor directly targeted at non-state actors, 
nevertheless it remains an important part of a comprehensive national security strategy.  
Moreover, Kapur provides an analysis of both supply and demand requirements of 
nuclear terrorism and concludes that states can pursue both as they are not mutually 
exclusive.125  Therefore, if the potential for proliferation exists, then creating a strategy 
that reduces demand for WMD only serves to bolster counter-proliferation efforts and 
should be pursued. 
C. RECENT U.S. POLICY THREATS 
As with Chapter III, this section analyzes the most recent documents available at 
the time of writing.  Also, the U.S. strategy relating to deterring WMD terrorism on the 
United States is not expected to change drastically with the Obama administration.  The 
first document reviewed, the 2006 National Security Strategy, focuses on counter-
proliferation and deterrence by denial methods while declaring that U.S. strategy does not 
rely on threat of punishment.126  Instead, this strategy builds on denying enemy 
objectives and reserves retaliation for events of policy failure.  More importantly, it 
establishes two target audiences (terrorists and source states) through its statement that 
“terrorists continue to pursue WMD and that some of the world’s weapons-grade fissile 
material is not properly protected.”127 
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Likewise, the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security echoes the claim that 
terrorists intend to acquire WMD to carry out massive attacks on America.128  
Maintaining consistency with the previous document, it also promotes deterrence by 
denial methods, but incorporates a more robust punishment strategy.  The policy also 
provides more specificity on the intended targets of threat:  state sponsors, terrorist 
groups, and other non-state actors who support terrorism.129  Furthermore, it discusses 
actual methods to retaliate such as alienating supporters, prosecuting terrorists, counter-
narrative campaigns, and global engagement.130  
The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and the Strategy to Combat 
Weapons of Mass Destruction directly address the issue of nuclear terrorism.  The first 
establishes a “new deterrence calculus” aimed at the demand side of WMD, but leans 
heavily toward non-punitive forms of deterrence as it claims that terrorists are less 
responsive to threats.  However, the first document vaguely refers to the threat of nuclear 
retaliation in response to nuclear terror.  It states that “terrorists and those who aid or 
sponsor a WMD attack would face the prospect of an overwhelming response to any use 
of such weapons.”131 
Likewise, the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
declares the “right to respond with overwhelming force—including through resort to all 
of our options—to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and 
friends and allies.”132  As Freedman describes it, this policy brings together multiple 
concepts to form a new deterrence strategy that combines arms control, active defenses, 
and preemptive action with threat of punishment as the foundation.133  Furthermore, 
through this document the U.S. signals a more direct punishment message to states with 
                                                 
128 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 1–53, 6. 
129 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 25. 
130 Ibid., 27. 
131 Executive Office of the President, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 1–23, 14. 
132 Executive Office of the President, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 3. 
133 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 566,  453. 
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nuclear technology and material.  It threatens to destroy the “residual WMD capabilities” 
for a nuclear attack and reaffirms that such a response will deter others from pursuing 
such weapons.134 
D. NUCLEAR TERRORISM SCENARIO 
Although terrorists have conducted small-scale WMD attacks using sarin gas and 
anthrax, to date they have not executed an act of nuclear terror.  While this undoubtedly 
is a welcomed reality, it does limit the research material available for establishing a 
historically-rooted attack scenario.  And, unfortunately, some of the best sources for 
hypothetical illustrations are found in fiction novels.  Regardless, there are two ways this 
type of attack could occur:  Either a non-state actor acquires or builds a nuclear device by 
criminal means, or a state willingly provides an intact weapon.  Taking these divergent 
paths into consideration, retaliation options would have to include measures to address 
each case. 
However, as Whiteneck argues, stateless nuclear terrorism is more likely, because 
states understand that they are easier to punish and so realize the weakness of relying on 
anonymity.135  Also, state-supported nuclear terror would constitute an act of war by a 
nation-state, which more aligns with traditional national security strategy.  Therefore, the 
most relevant scenario for evaluating U.S. response to nuclear terror would depict a non-
state actor acquiring a nuclear device or fissile material without deliberate state support.  
One such scenario is found in the 2005 National Planning Scenarios developed by the 
Department of Homeland Security, which describes the background information and 
predicted effects of a ten kiloton improvised nuclear device detonating in Washington, 
D.C. 
                                                 
134 Executive Office of the President, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 3. 
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In this scenario, highly enriched uranium is stolen from stockpiles in Russia then 
sold on the black market to a non-state actor for a significant amount of money.136  The 
material is smuggled to a third country where the terrorists have safe haven and have 
built an underground laboratory.  There, a couple of scientists use the HEU to build a 
gun-type nuclear weapon with a potential yield of ten kilotons.  The terrorist leaders 
devise a plan to have operatives, with the help of other supporters, detonate the weapon 
in a U.S. city.  The non-state actor uses sympathetic businesses to ship two sets of the 
weapon’s non-nuclear components to America.  Also, a senior lieutenant of the 
organization with assistance from criminal elements smuggles the fissile material across 
the border and is met by supporters already in the America.  Those supporters provide a 
safe house, transportation and supplies to the bombers.  Once everything is in place, the 
leaders provide the bombers with a time and place to detonate the weapon—the center of 
Washington, D.C., on a busy weekday. 
The immediate blast and fire effects coupled with secondary effects result in 
significant casualties and damage.  The immediate damage to infrastructure reaches out 
to nearly a kilometer in every direction with eventual contamination covering 
approximately 8,000 square kilometers.  The electromagnetic pulse generated by the 
detonation has effects as far away as five kilometers.  The population receives several 
blows beginning with the blast overpressure, fragmentation, extreme heat, and gamma 
radiation exposure from the initial explosion, then radiation sickness from subsequent 
effects of radioactive fallout, and so on.  The scenario estimates over 70,000 fatalities and 
more than 600,000 injured at the onset with those numbers continuing to grow for several 
days thereafter (see Appendix for more details).  Also, those who are not seriously 
injured must evacuate the contaminated area resulting in the displacement of another 
million persons.  Finally, the economic impact resulting from all of this would cost the 
nation hundreds of billions of dollars.137 
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E. POTENTIAL TARGETS OF RETALIATION 
From the scenario described above, one can quickly extract the fundamental 
actors involved with successfully acquiring and detonating an improvised nuclear device 
on American soil.  It is clear that the organization’s desire alone will not deliver a nuclear 
weapon, but rather it requires a significant amount of capital and a source of nuclear 
materials.  Additionally, a common component to either stealing a weapon or the fissile 
materials to build one is the involvement of international criminal networks for 
acquisition and smuggling operations.  Auerswald notes that literature on crime and 
deterrence supports targeting criminals that traffic weapons of mass destruction because 
these elements are not ideological zealots and tend to pursue crimes with high ratios of 
payoff to risk.138 
Furthermore, the terrorist network (its leaders and members) provides the intent 
and pursues the means, but bringing desires to fruition are the scientists, businesses, and 
community supporters.  Also, safe communications for effective command and control 
enable operations from the acquisition of nuclear material to the successful detonation.  
Analyzing the state-support aspect of this scenario provides two prospects.  First, the 
state failing to secure nuclear materials bears some responsibility, regardless of its 
intentions.  The second state-level target for this scenario is the one providing the 
terrorists safe haven from which to base operations and operate the weapons laboratory.  
The punishment options for each state will likely be affected by the degree of negligence 
and extent of knowledge.  
The next step is to determine the list of relevant threats found in current policy 
documents.  Recalling the policy analysis from Chapter II, current counterterrorism 
strategies found in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and the Strategy to 
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction provide methods that the United States intends to 
employ against terrorists.  Its counterterrorism measures target the following 
components:  ideology, propaganda, terrorist network, funding, means-of-travel and 
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communication, state support, and safe havens.  While these strategies are clearly 
directed at a vulnerability of the terrorist network, the specific WMD policy which refers 
to responding with nuclear weapons instead signals a particular method of retaliation 
without reference to the target.  Nevertheless, it does reveal the threat of nuclear 
retaliation in response to a WMD attack on the United States by a non-state actor.  
Therefore, nuclear retaliation has been included with the other forms or retaliation to 
formulate a list of threats signaled by current U.S. policy in response to a terrorist attack.  
F. EVALUATION OF POSSIBLE RESPONSES 
Reflecting on the response to 9/11, the American people would support the 
majority of reprisal options described above.  Beginning with the terrorists’ political 
goals, America would launch an all out counter-narrative and military campaign against 
those aims while providing unprecedented support to the terrorists’ opposition.  It would 
also destroy or disrupt the terrorists’ communications capabilities while launching a full 
cyber-warfare campaign to shutdown their ability to exploit the Internet.  Those regions 
providing fertile populations for radicalization would be targeted with unprecedented 
non-kinetic nation building and democratization operations.  The United States would 
pursue the entire organization and affiliated networks with more prowess and persistence 
then it did with al Qaeda after 9/11.  Setting out to kill or capture the terrorist leaders and 
those involved in the nuclear attack would most likely be demanded, not just accepted.  
Non-state supporters that supply materials, access to business operations, and provide 
safe houses and transportation would be globally pursued and prosecuted by various 
means and methods to include military operations.   
Without question, the nation would support global seizure of funds and assets 
from those that provided material and financial services to the terrorist organization as 
reparations.  Any business or charity organizations found guilty of providing support to 
the non-state actor would be attacked by the various elements of national power to inflict 
severe defamation and degrade their ability to continue operating.  Also, the United 
States would manipulate foreign aid and pursue economic sanctions to retaliate against 
supporting communities of any nation. 
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In order to deny the terrorist any capability for future attacks, the Unites States 
would use whatever means necessary to destroy residual weapons capabilities to include 
targeting those criminal elements which provided the nuclear materials.  It would 
globally pursue the suppliers, arms dealers, smugglers, and their organizational affiliates 
in order to bring them to justice.  Whether the host nation government willingly provided 
a permissive environment or simply turned a blind eye, it could expect the United States 
to force a regime change or support an opposing movement’s bid for power.  This effort 
would run congruent to efforts that target the terrorists’ base of operations, training 
camps, weapons laboratories and other facilities within the host nation.  However, it is 
reasonable to assume that the level of retaliation directed towards the supporting state 
would be proportional to that state’s material power and culpability in the attack. 
As a matter of fact, there would be little debate about fully implementing all 
retaliatory strategies of recent policy until considering punishment against another 
nuclear-power state and, more controversial, whether that reprisal would incorporate 
nuclear weapons.  While it is clear the United States would pursue the criminal elements 
involved in supplying fissile material, direct retaliation against Russia seems unlikely in 
this scenario.  For example, it could target Russia’s apparently unsecure stockpiles of 
residual nuclear materials, but military strikes increase the risk of escalating war with a 
nuclear-armed adversary.  Clearly, the target nation’s second-strike capability will affect 
the decision to retaliate with nuclear weapons regardless of culpability.  Not only could 
Russia retaliate in kind, it could also claim to have made a real effort to secure nuclear 
materials due to its willingness to accept U.S. assistance in dismantling and securing its 
nuclear arsenal.  As part of this assistance, the U.S. has spent hundreds of millions 
through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and billions more to purchase HEU 
under the “Megatons to Megawatts” agreement.139   
Furthermore, one could reasonably question whether the American public would 
support the use of nuclear weapons on societal targets of a nation that provided the 
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terrorists safe haven or supported the terrorist network because most of the population 
might be non-complicit third-parties.  Although, after an attack, some part of the U.S. 
public would likely be unconcerned with this distinction in its desire for vengeance, it 
would be hard for the United States to openly threaten nuclear annihilation of innocent 
civilians ahead of time.  Even if the terrorists claimed responsibility for nuclear terror, 
thereby removing any doubt concerning attribution, identifying a viable target that would 
garner political support for a nuclear strike remains difficult.  In other words, since 
terrorists have no national territory to threaten, nuclear retaliation is realistically limited 
to (but not required for) state-sanctioned nuclear terrorism.140  Furthermore, opponents of 
nuclear retaliation would claim that conventional military ordnance provides sufficient 
capability for punishing or destroying the more localized terrorist targets and third party 
supporters as well as residual WMD stockpiles. They would also argue that a nuclear 
strike that killed innocent civilians would cause the United States to lose world sympathy 
and the moral high ground and would generate new support for the terrorists. 
This brings us back to the question of whether the U.S. could credibly threaten to 
employ nuclear weapons to strike any of these targets.  In response to the situation and 
actors of this scenario, it is hard to support an argument that nuclear retaliation would be 
employed against Russia for inadvertently “supplying” fissile material as suggested 
above.  But what if it had been a nation without a (nuclear) second-strike capability such 
as North Korea, Pakistan, or Iran?  If everything stayed constant in this scenario except 
the source state was North Korea, then the United States could launch a nuclear strike 
without fear of second strike.  However, it is not guaranteed that political will would 
support this option if the rogue state was an unwilling victim of crime as in the case of 
Russia in this scenario.  Otherwise, the argument returns to the assumption made earlier 
that a rogue state willingly providing nuclear capabilities to terrorists would be 
committing an act of nuclear war for which the United States would be justified in 
launching a nuclear retaliation (legitimate purpose of America’s second-strike capability).  
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In such a situation, national will and target opportunities would align for a politically 
acceptable and executable nuclear retaliation option. 
An initial “willingness” or even active demand of the American public to use 
nuclear weapons in response to an act of nuclear terror is certainly conceivable.  
However, because attributing responsibility for being the source of nuclear materials 
takes time, the issues associated with threatening unwitting states will likely deflate that 
“willingness” during the attribution and target selection phase for retaliation.  It is 
reasonable to doubt a pledge of nuclear retaliation as a response for this scenario, and it 
therefore lacks credibility as a threat for deterring stateless-nuclear terror.  To summarize 
the results, the analysis of relevancy and credibility for each threat is illustrated in Table 
3.  The recent policy threat (counterterrorism strategy) is considered relevant if it 
correlates to a potential target from the scenario and credible if the retaliation option is a 
plausible response to the given scenario. 
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Battle of ideas/Democracy Political goals, propaganda, and recruiting Yes 
Information operations campaign 
and democratization Yes 
Target terrorist network Leaders, members, recruiters Yes Kill or capture Yes 
Target finance Financiers, charities, businesses, communities Yes 
Seize assets, shutdown charities, 
seek financial reparations Yes 
Target communications Command and control system Yes Disrupt communications capabilities, cyber warfare Yes 
Deny weapons Fissile material stockpile, arms dealers, smugglers Yes 
Destroy residual capabilities and 
target criminal elements Yes 
Target state sponsor Permissive state, source of nuclear materials Yes 
Economic sanctions, regime 
change, reparations, and 
conventional military engagement 
Yes* 
Target safe havens Base of operations and labs Yes Military strikes, economic sanctions, regime change Yes 
Nuclear retaliation  Permissive state, source of nuclear materials Yes 
Launch nuclear strike against 
complicit states No** 
* Retaliation proportional to the state’s power and culpability in the attack which could affect credibility 
** While “national will” is conceivable, lack of culpability and second-strike capability of states in this scenario raise doubt 




The results of this analysis suggest that retaliation methods for an act of nuclear 
terror would reflect U.S. responses to the 9/11 attacks by al Qaeda.  Yet, as devastating as 
it was, 9/11 would pale in comparison to the scenario described above.  Therefore, one 
could reasonably assume that the United States would seek to punish every target that 
aligns with striking the influential nodes described above:  the terrorist network, its 
political aims, its finances, its communications, and the supporting state.  Also, the 
analysis confirms that current U.S. policy does contain effective threats to develop a 
credible WMD deterrence message as evident in the correlation between the main 
components of the scenario and counterterrorism strategies.   
However, some threats are situation dependent or not plausible forms of 
retaliation, and thus lack credibility.  For example, the U.S. could easily threaten a rogue 
state for supporting terrorists when it possesses overwhelming military superiority, but 
would that threat remain credible against a country with second-strike capability for 
nuclear proliferation violations (intentional or inadvertent)?  Clearly, targeting the state 
from which nuclear materials originate poses a dilemma that needs to be discussed in 
greater detail to establish a universally applicable form of punishment.  Nonetheless, 
effectively deterring non-state actors from committing WMD attacks would eliminate the 
demand for these materials which alleviates the predicament of punishing Russia or any 
other nuclear-armed state for allowing WMD to leak to non-state actors.  This point 
highlights the need to make deterring the terrorist network as effective as possible to 
overcome the difficulty of credibly threatening states that might be sources of nuclear 
materials. This will require focusing more effort on influencing the demand for WMD. 
The evidence also suggests that the U.S. could not sufficiently guarantee that it 
would retaliate with nuclear weapons if the states involved were not willing participants, 
but rather victims of a criminal theft or unwitting host to the guilty organization.  





stateless nuclear terrorism.  First, targeting states with nuclear retaliation for failing to 
secure nuclear material would not automatically attain political support.  Furthermore, 
some source nations possess strategic nuclear weapons and therefore have the capability 
to launch a second-strike on America.  Second, it would be very difficult for the United 
States to target a nuclear strike against a nation that provided safe haven (i.e. where do 
you aim).  Nuclear weapons are indiscriminate and therefore difficult to pinpoint the 
targeting of guilty parties whether a rogue regime, terrorist camp or community 
supporters.  While nuclear retaliation is not completely unreasonable, these issues do 
bring into question the surety that it would be employed. 
Coincidentally, the research exposed an issue not explored in this study due to its 
complexity.  While the door may not open for nuclear weapons, public tolerance for other 
measures may relax.  For example, under less destructive attacks it would be taboo and 
inconceivable to establish a deterrent message that threatens to destroy historic or 
religious places—that might become more plausible in response to an act of nuclear 
terror.  Nevertheless, the important component of threat to signal is the object of 
retaliation and not how the target will be attacked.  In other words, the legitimacy of 
targeting a rogue or unwitting state is what limits retaliation options, not necessarily the 
choice of weapons.  If, however, nuclear weapons are to play a role in deterring nuclear 
terror, the U.S. may need to alter its nuclear strategy and the composition of its nuclear 
arsenal to achieve the right mix of capabilities.   
In closing, a terrorist system requires various components to perform specific 
operations when mounting different types of attack.  Hence, states should direct threat 
towards those components with the maximum force supported by its population, and that 
political capital is directly proportional to the level of devastation.  Deterrent threats 
should signal a graduated retaliatory response framework that would align punishment 
threats with the level of domestic support likely to be generated by the type of attack.  





Therefore, it should specified as an option for responding to state-sponsored nuclear 
attacks, but not implicit as a direct threat of punishment for any other nuclear attack.  
Finally, the results of this analysis provide a sample retaliation framework to create a 
more direct deterrence message that would clearly articulate the expected punishment for 





The primary objective of this study was to evaluate the deterrent effect of recent 
counterterrorism policies of the United States.  This objective was accomplished through 
a two part analysis of the threats to punish terrorist targets found in those policies.  The 
first step sought to validate counterterrorism strategies as relevant threats of retaliation 
for deterring non-state actors.  The second step then estimated the credibility of those 
threats deemed relevant by analyzing whether they would be plausible responses to 
hypothetical attack scenarios.  The following sections summarize the results of those 
evaluations respectively. 
1. Validation of U.S. Policy Threats 
The results of the first section support the claim that violent non-state actors have 
goals and assets that, when appropriately threatened, might cause them to make 
responsive decisions to avoid loss.   First, research material on al Qaeda was analyzed to 
determine how best to depict the behavior of terrorists.  This evaluation suggested that 
non-state actors are organizations and their organizational characteristics come into play 
when they make decisions.  This implies that the deterrer needs to identify and threaten 
the organizational nodes that influence the decisions and operations of a terrorist system.  
Therefore, using organizational behavior theory as a lens, the next step was to indentify 
exploitable vulnerabilities of non-state actors to compare against counterterrorism 
objectives.  For example, non-state actors must maintain key elements of survival: safe 
havens, anonymity, financial backing, means of travel, and means of communications to 
name a few.141  Effectively targeting the vulnerabilities of these nodes should have an 
effect on the organization’s decisions.  To that end, the terrorist system model created by 
Davis and Jenkins was selected to serve as a baseline to evaluate the targets of U.S. 
policy threats.  Consequently, the analysis confirms that punishment methods described 
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in counterterrorism strategy correlate to vulnerabilities derived from theories on 
influencing the terrorist system by Davis and Jenkins.  This supports the claim that U.S. 
policy appropriately targets terrorist nodes with relevant threats of punishment to 
influence outcomes. 
However, it is important to point out that there are limits to the punishment of 
those targets based on anticipated U.S. public support.  As with any strategy, the nation’s 
population must be willing and able to achieve its objectives.  For example, striking a 
societal target may have a desirable impact on an important center of gravity, but public 
support could constrain that option, based on how it judges the morality of such reprisal.  
Therefore, signaling a method of reprisal that does not meet this parameter undermines 
the credibility of threat and, therefore, fails to meet the prerequisites for deterrence.  Just 
as Americans understood and accepted second-strike policies of the Cold War, the public 
would have to recognize and assent to the retaliatory threats against terrorism for 
deterrence to be effective. 
2. Credibility of U.S. Policy Threats 
Next, the credibility of those policy threats deemed relevant in Chapter II was 
analyzed by comparing the expected responses to two different attack scenarios in 
Chapters III and IV.  The first evaluation determined whether each policy threat would be 
a plausible response to a cyber attack on the nation’s banking system which had caused 
catastrophic damages to the economy.  Then, a similar analysis was conducted to 
evaluate the expected retaliation for a terrorist attack involving a ten kiloton nuclear 
detonation in Washington, D.C. 
In summary, the analysis in Chapter III demonstrated that while U.S. policy 
threatens relevant targets for the scenario, it lacks credibility because some of those 
threats are unrealistic responses to a cyber attack.  In practice, the level of retaliation for a 
cyber attack would pale in comparison to that after the 9/11 attacks by al Qaeda because 
of the significant difference in human casualties.  Therefore, one could reasonably 
assume that the United States would implement a less significant response.  However, 
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U.S. policy signals the intent to punish all acts of terrorism by pursuing all of the 
counterterrorism measures and does not distinguish between types of attack or methods 
of enforcement.  And, given that some of the policy threats (e.g., killing terrorists, 
counter-societal targeting, and nuclear retaliation) appear implausible in response to a 
cyber attack suggests that U.S. policy does not credibly deter cyber terrorism.   
To expound, a United States response to cyber terrorism would most likely 
embrace measures that focus retaliatory efforts at the terrorist system and the cyber 
network enabling the attack.  Attacking the terrorist system would include capturing all 
terrorist leaders, members, and direct supporters to bring before the justice system for 
punishment.  But, one could argue that there would be resistance to the “kill” part of the 
“kill or capture” strategy for punishing the terrorist network.  The U.S. response would 
also target all sources and channels of financial backing to arrest those complicit in the 
attack, seize funds for reparations, and shutdown guilty businesses and charities.  Also, 
all of the communications systems, cyber hardware, facilities, and networks involved in 
the attack would be disabled or destroyed in order to prevent future attacks and punish 
permissive states and companies that fail to police their systems.  And yet, the expected 
retaliation would most likely exclude methods of punishment that employ the use of 
military forces against either states or societies.  For example, even though a host nation 
had provided a permissive environment for cyber crime, it would be unrealistic to assume 
the United States would force a regime change or conduct counter-societal targeting in 
response to an act of cyber terrorism. 
Next, the results of Chapter IV suggest that retaliation methods for an act of 
nuclear terror would at a minimum reflect the U.S. response to 9/11.  Yet, as devastating 
as those attacks were, 9/11 would pale in comparison to the effects of a ten kiloton blast 
in the heart of a U.S. metropolis.  Therefore, one could reasonably assume that the United 
States would seek to punish every potential target that played a role in the attack:  the 
terrorist network, its political aims, its finances, its communications, its third party 
supporters, and any supporting states. 
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This analysis supported the claim that recent U.S. policy does contain effective 
threats to develop a credible WMD deterrence message as evident in the correlation 
between the primary targets of the scenario and the targets of counterterrorism strategy.  
However, some threats are situation dependent or not plausible forms of retaliation, and 
thus lack credibility.  For example, the U.S. could credibly threaten a rogue state for 
supporting terrorism when the U.S. possesses overwhelming military superiority, but that 
threat would not be credible against a second-strike-capable nation in retaliation for 
nuclear proliferation violations (intentional or inadvertent).  Therefore, targeting the state 
from which nuclear materials originate poses a dilemma that needs to be discussed in 
greater detail to establish a universally applicable form of punishment. 
The evidence also suggests that nuclear retaliation would not provide a realistic 
option for responding to stateless nuclear terrorism.  First, targeting states with nuclear 
retaliation for failing to secure nuclear material would not automatically receive political 
support.  Secondly, as previously mentioned some source nations possess strategic 
nuclear weapons and therefore have the capability to launch a second-strike on America.  
Therefore, an ambiguous threat of nuclear retaliation for a terrorist WMD attack may 
lessen credibility.  Instead, policy statements should avoid the implicit threat of nuclear 
retaliation for any WMD attack and specifically threaten it as a response to state-
sponsored nuclear attacks.  Otherwise the United States would have to change the 
cultural and international taboos that would undermine public willingness to use nuclear 
weapons against non-state targets. 
3. Summary of Results 
The results of this analysis confirm that U.S. policy contains relevant targets and 
threats for deterring terrorism that evaluated under the two scenarios of this thesis yield 
different outcomes.  The expected response to a cyber attack would clearly differ from 
that of a nuclear attack, yet U.S. policy declares the same threats for terrorism in general.  
This is not to say that policy makers lack knowledge or understanding that retaliation will 




articulate how responses will differ.  Consequently, these undifferentiated signals 
diminish the potential for counterterrorism strategies to deter non-state actors from 
committing terrorist attacks on the United States. 
The results suggests that a number of punishment measures in U.S. policy are too 
vaguely threatened, directed at overly general targets, or would be subjected to 
deliberation before being employed.  This uncertainty of punishment reduces credibility 
of current policy threats because it fails to clearly define the costs of committing acts of 
terrorism for non-state actors.  Just as criminal law assigns a degree of punishment based 
on the type of crime and consequence, deterrent threats must clearly articulate the 
associated punishment to the type of attack.  The results of these analyses are 
summarized in Table 4 to illustrate how the general threats of punishment found in 
counterterrorism strategy documents do not correlate with the retaliation that would 
reasonably be expected in response to differing attacks.   
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Recent U.S. Counterterrorism Strategies Credible Retaliation Threat 
Targets Threats Cyber Terrorism 
Nuclear 
Terrorism 
Ideology Battle of ideas (counter-narrative campaign); Democracy (promote rights and freedoms) Yes Yes 
Terrorist network Attack terrorist network: kill or capture members No Yes 
Finances Attack source of funding: seize assets; penalize contributors, charities, businesses; seek reparations Yes Yes 
Communications 
Deny or disrupt communications: stop charity 





Conduct military operations, cyber warfare; secure 




Attack the supporting state: economic sanctions, 
insurgency, military strikes, regime change, counter-
societal targeting, seize assets, cut-off aid, restrict 
travel 
No Yes 
Safe havens Destroy all safe havens: physical, cyber, legal, and financial  Yes Yes 
Nuclear retaliation  Use nuclear weapons in response to terrorism No No* 
* This refers to stateless nuclear terrorism opposed to state-sanctioned nuclear terrorism.  Although the U.S. may be 
willing to use nuclear weapons, a supporting state’s lack of culpability or its second-strike capability would introduce 
doubt on the surety of this punishment. 
Table 4.   Mixed credibility of recent policy threats 
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B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
While U.S. policy does threaten appropriate targets, it also fails to specify what 
type of punishment would be delivered for a particular attack.  Unfortunately, the 
composition of terrorist systems varies by type of attack because each requires different 
components to perform specific functions.  Hence, the United States should direct threats 
toward those components with the maximum force supported by its population, and that 
is likely to be directly proportional to the level of devastation sustained.  In other words, 
deterrent threats should signal a graduated retaliatory response framework that would 
align with the public willingness to intensify punishment based on the type of attack.   
Nevertheless, one could argue that this specificity limits deterrence only to those 
types of attack identified in policy.  However, that would assume the United States does 
not know precisely what it wants to deter.  This does not intend to suggest that calculated 
ambiguity should be completely abandoned, but rather that it should be incorporated into 
the sub-level threat messages of an attack-based retaliation strategy.  Since it cannot 
credibly deter all acts of violence with a single threat of retaliation—as shown in the 
comparison of responses above—the United States should first determine what acts it 
intends to deter then develop a more defined deterrence strategy that credibly signals the 
level and type of response non-state actors can expect in retaliation for each.   
In closing, U.S. deterrent strategy should include more specificity to clarify the 
correlation between punishment and undesired actions to increase the effectiveness of 
deterrence.  An attack-based retaliation strategy would provide that specificity by clearly 
articulating the credible costs to be imposed on the nodes-of-influence for committing an 
attack.  Coincidently, evaluations of the expected retaliation for cyber and nuclear 
terrorism scenarios of this study provide the components to develop an example of an 
attack-based retaliation framework, which is illustrated in Table 5.  The first column lists 
the targets that were validated in Chapter II as relevant centers of gravity for influencing 
non-state actors’ decisions.  The subsequent columns list credible threats for retaliating 
against those targets by type of attack.  The retaliatory threats in each box meet the 
80 
 
criteria of a plausible response for the particular type of attack while targeting an 
appropriate vulnerability for deterring terrorism.  For example, attacking the terrorist 
network was validated as a relevant target for retaliation.   Tracing across the table to the 
cyber terrorism column yields the credible threats of retaliation for a cyber attack:  
capture and prosecute terrorist members, sever the links between leaders and cells, and 
restrict travel of all known associates.  In contrast, the threat of retaliation for a nuclear 
attack would be a more aggressive kill or capture campaign that involves military 
operations and clandestine methods to hunt down the entire terrorist network.  Obviously, 
the example framework depicted in Table 5 is not meant to serve as a policy ready 
strategy, but merely to provide a methodological approach that would increase the 




Retaliation Framework for U.S. Deterrence Policy (Example) 






Ideology Information operations campaign Information operations campaign, democratization 
Terrorist network Capture terrorists, sever links, restrict travel Kill or capture 
Finances Seize assets, shutdown charities, seek financial reparations 
Seize assets, shutdown charities, seek financial 
reparations 
Communications Disrupt communication capabilities and Internet access 
Disrupt communication capabilities and Internet 
access 
Weapons and materiel Target terrorist cyber-networks and electronic hardware 
Destroy residual capabilities and target criminal 
elements 
State sponsor Cyber warfare on host nation’s network 
Economic sanctions, regime change, reparations, 
and conventional military war 
Safe havens Military strikes on terrorist facilities Military strikes, economic sanctions, host nation regime change 
Nuclear retaliation  None Specifically declare as response against a state that willingly sponsored nuclear terrorism 
Table 5.   Proposed attack-based retaliation framework for U.S. deterrence policy
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C. LEVERAGING DETERRENCE 
The counterterrorism methods found in recent policy were developed to support 
an offensive campaign against terrorism and an associated doctrine of prevention and 
preemption, and have not been emphasized as part of an effort to send a deterrence 
message aimed at those non-state organizations yet to commit terrorist attacks on the 
United States.  However, many counterterrorism objectives are difficult to accomplish in 
the prevention stage, yet become much easier to enforce in the punishment stage.  For 
example, consider the difficulty of policing charity organizations on a global scale until 
after an attack when investigators are able to narrow the search parameters to effectively 
trace funding channels.  “One reason that the global charitable sector remains vulnerable 
to terrorist financing is that charities are still subjected to lesser regulatory 
requirements.”142  However, post-9/11 efforts to combat Al Qaeda financing have been 
effective.  For example, “in his July 2005 letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Ayman al-
Zawahiri humbly asked the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq if he could spare a payment of 
approximately one hundred thousand because many of the lines have been cut off.”143 
Since several aspects of these counter-terrorism methods occur outside the 
continental United States, gaining international cooperation would be advantageous.  In 
order to provide for a meaningful and lasting campaign, members of the global 
community must take action to establish cooperative agreements for freezing terrorists’ 
financial assets and seizing those funds to use for financing future counter-terrorism 
operations.  Additionally, laws must be established in all nations to prosecute those 
practicing cyber-warfare as telecommunications transcend national borders.  The 
international community must be able to collectively pursue terrorist suspects across 
borders and bring them to justice. 
                                                 
142 Levitt and Jacobson, "The U.S. Campaign to Squeeze Terrorists' Financing," 67–85, 78. 
143 Ibid., 79. 
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D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study touched upon several areas that provide opportunities for further study 
and debate.  First, while this thesis attempted to show the value and purpose of an attack-
based retaliation framework, additional research and analysis would have to be 
accomplished before this approach could be realized in U.S. deterrence strategy.  Those 
efforts would need to determine what forms of terrorism the United States intends to 
deter in order to develop a complete list of attack scenarios.  Then, potential retaliation 
options would need to be evaluated as responses to each of those scenarios to flesh out an 
operational retaliation framework. 
The second area that requires additional research relates to the application of 
“extended deterrence” in deterring terrorist attacks.  Assuming the United States 
developed a more defined retaliation policy for deterring terrorist attacks, should the 
United States guarantee that response for an attack on its allies as well?  Currently, the 
practice of extended deterrence is crucial to the stability and security of allies in Europe 
and Asia because it provides a nuclear umbrella that triggers the same response to an 
attack on them as one on America.  Applying this concept to deterring terrorism would 
obviously pose significant challenges based on the variety and severity of retaliation 
options, but seems likely that it would at least apply to state-sponsored nuclear terrorism. 
Next, an interesting possibility for retaliating against permissive states that were 
the host nation of a catastrophic cyber attack on the United States is electromagnetic 
pulse.  Detonating a nuclear weapon at high attitudes above the target state, the punisher 
could generate an electromagnetic pulse to destroy electronics of the host nation.  Just as 
cyber terrorism only inflicts electronic damage on the United States, EMP retaliation 
would limit destructiveness to electronics of the enemy.  However, using a nuclear 
weapon in response to a non-WMD attack would break the nuclear taboo and raise issues 
concerning international norms.  Also, the actual effects of this application would need to 
be addressed in order to evaluate the degree of punishment as it relates to the crime.  




study due to its complexity.  While the door may not open for nuclear weapons, public 
tolerance for other measures may relax.  For example under less destructive attacks it 
would be taboo and inconceivable to establish a deterrent message that threatens to 
destroy historic or religious places— yet it might be more plausible in response to an act 
of nuclear terror.  Further research may provide additional retaliation options that would 





Table 6.   A possible set of realistic estimated results from individuals in a given zone at the 
time of detonation of a 10 kiloton nuclear device.  (From 2005 National Planning 
Scenarios page 1–39.)144 
                                                 
144United States Department of Homeland Security, National Planning Scenarios, 1.39. 
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